In 2009 the Australian government published its Defence White Paper stating that for many decades Australia and the Asia Pacific region had been enjoying an era of stability and peace largely as a result of the strategic primacy of the United States. Ominously it goes on to say that the rise of China is shrinking the power gap between the US and China and is a threat to US primacy. It goes on to say that as the US is increasingly tested there is a ‘concerning possibility of growing confrontation” between the powers (Australian Government 2009, p. 49). This thinking gave rise to papers such as John Mearsheimers The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia (Mearsheimer 2010) that warn of impending great power conflict in the region and inspired Graham Allison to write first an essay and then book that coin the phrase Thucydide’s Trap to describe the conflict caused by a rising power disrupting the status quo (Allison 2015), (Allison 2017).

Thucydide’s Trap refers to the ancient Greek historian (and general) best known for his work Histories of the Peloponnesian War. Allison uses the quote “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” And it is through this lens that Allison focuses on U.S.-China relations portraying China as the ambitious rising power and the U.S. as the hegemon unwilling to give up its position. His conclusion is that direct conflict between the U.S. and China is all but inevitable without major efforts toward peace by both sides.

This paper examines two debates around the concept of Thucydides’ Trap. Firstly, we look at whether the theory is an accurate depiction of the cause of conflict. Wars start for many reasons does the Trap theory provide a broad enough perspective for reasonable analysis? Secondly we examine if Allison’s analogy between the Athens – Sparta conflict and U.S.-China relations is an historically apt one. Are the power dynamics as similar as made out or could other forces be a play that need to be included in any analysis?

Our conclusion is that while the Thucydides trap metaphor is a generally useful device to focus attention on the U.S.-China situation a general sense. It is not terribly historically accurate and analysts should beware of its simplistic approaches to a complex topic.

Is Thucydidies’ Trap Too Simple?

The popular description of the Trap is quite simple. Basically a metaphor for power transition theory it focuses on a single factor, the overtaking of a hegemon by a rising power, to explain interstate war in this case the Peloponnesian War.  However, as Chan points out the historical analogy comparing the U.S. to the authoritarian state of Sparta and China to democratic Athens is somewhat ironic and the claim that war becomes “inevitable” as the rising power catches up to the dominant power is a rainbow connection that ignores some 2500 years of developments such as the modern state system, nuclear weapons and nationalism. He goes on to claim that the nature of American democracy would preclude them from launching a preventative war against China (Chan 2019, pp. 12-13).

Continuing to examine the causes of conflict through the Peloponnesian lens Jaffe tells us that the causes of the war were not solely due to an external structural necessity but include the intricate cultural and psychological responses unique to the belligerents (Jaffe 2017) and Chan goes on to speculate that factors such as armament races, economic characteristics, alliances and leader’s personalities also play a role (Chan 2019, p. 15).

Allison does address some of these issues in Destined for War however the use of the “Rise of Athens” line to define Thucydides’ Trap has in some cases led to an overly simplistic view of IR and can lead to analysts falling into the trap of attributing monocausal explanations to what is usually a complex situation.

Different Power Dynamics

Thucydides describes the Athenian rise to power in the first book of History (Collingwood 1830).  After the Persian Wars Athens exploited a maritime alliance to exert control over its allies, demanded tribute and violently suppressed any defection or decent. It embarked in a campaign to coerce other Greek city-states to join its “alliance” the Delian League. These activities began to encroach on Sparta’s sphere of influence provoking the Spartans to declare war. This description of the conflicts origins is at odds with the current U.S.-China relationship. Frideberg argues that while China does seek some form of regional hegemony it does not pursue conquest over its neighbours (Friedberg 2011, p. 157).  (Lee 2019, p. 76) tells us that despite concerns regarding the build-up of influence from the One Belt One Road program it would be an exaggeration to claim that China was aiming to reduce other countries to imperial vassals. While the situation could change the evidence so far indicates that the U.S is facing a very different strategic challenge than what Sparta faced so long ago.

Of further concern regarding the power dynamics in play are the differences in how war is perceived by the belligerents. Eckstein tells us that war in ancient Greece was common and considered a legitimate, normal course of action. Society today approaches war with far greater caution with greater regard to its costs in life and wealth. Unbridled aggression is not considered a legitimate method of resolving disputes (Eckstein 2017).

While these differences in power dynamics do not preclude the possibility of war they cast some doubt on the all-encompassing nature of the Thucydides Trap theory and its use of the Peloponnesian War as a metaphor for the current U.S.-China situation. 

Conclusion

Allisons use of the Thucydides’ Trap metaphor to draw attention to the potential for Chinas rise to lead to great power conflict provides a valuable lens through which to observe the current U.S.-China relationship. One needs to keep in mind however that while the comparison may be relevant in a general sense, a deeper and more encompassing analysis is required to get a true picture of the situation.

More from Security Studies

References

Allison, G., 2015. The Thucydides Trap: Are The US And China Headed For War?.. The Atlantic, 24(9).

Allison, G. T., 2017. Destined for war : Can America And China Escape Thucydides’s trap?. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Australian Government, 2009. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030. [Online]
Available at: http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf
[Accessed 3 July 2021].

Chan, S., 2019. More Than One Trap: Problematic Interpretations And Overlooked Lessons From Thucydides. Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 24, pp. 11-24.

‘BOOK I: CHAPTER IV: From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War – The Progress from Supremacy to Empire’ (1830) in History of the Peloponnesian War. S. Collingwood, pp. 30–38. Available at: https://search-ebscohost-com.simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lfh&AN=34346743&site=ehost-live (Accessed: 1 May 2022).

Eckstein, A. M., 2017. Thucydides, International Law and International Anarchy. In: R. K. Balot, S. Forsdyke & E. Foster, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides. New York, NY.: Oxford University Press.

Friedberg, A., 2011. A Contest For Supremacy: China, America, And The Struggle For Mastery In Asia. New York: Norton.

Jaffe, S. N., 2017. Thucydides On The outbreak Of War: Character And Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lee, J., 2019. Did Thucydides Believe in Thucydides’ Trap? The History of the Peloponnesian War and Its Relevance to U.S.-China Relations. Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 24, pp. 67-86.

Mearsheimer, J. J., 2010. The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 3, pp. 381-396.

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The Relevance of Traditional Concepts of Maritime Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

The nature of maritime warfare is in a near constant state of evolution and has most recently been reshaped by technological developments, globalization, and the rise of non-state actors. This paper examines the resulting debates regarding the continued relevance of “traditional” concepts of maritime strategy, particularly those established by figures such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. These traditional ideas were produced in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries as an answer to state-centric conflict and large-scale naval battles. However they now seem to be disconnected from the realities of contemporary conflicts which increasingly involves modern elements such as insurgencies and cyber warfare.

This paper argues that even with these recent changes, the core principles of maritime strategy, sea control, power projection, and the protection of maritime trade, remain relevant. This paper will explore the relevance of traditional maritime strategy by examining its foundational principles, the impact of modern technological and geopolitical shifts, and how navies have adapted to new forms of conflict.

Alfred Mahan’s seminal work on “sea power” was first published in 1890 (Mehan, 2011). His theories emphasized the critical role of naval superiority which would enable a nation to dominate international trade routes and leverage this control to dominate global politics (Speller, 2022). Sir Julian Corbett published his theories is 1911 (Corbett, 2008). His theories highlight the importance of cooperation between naval and land forces and the strategic use of maritime power as a subset of national strategy. This emphasis on broader strategic objectives that recognises the limitations of naval power offers a contrast to Mahan’s focus of decisive battles (Strachan, 2013). These theories have shaped naval thinking for over a century however are they still applicable in today’s geopolitical context?

Command of the sea is the first topic to be discussed in every naval strategy debate. Command of the sea “is one of those ringing phrases that dominates the imagination but confuses the intellect,” according to naval historian Geoffrey Till (Till, 2013). while Mahan is often given credit for the concept, practically every prominent naval scholar has written on it. The objective of sea power and the establishment of sea command, according to Mahan, is “the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it or allows it to appear only as a fugitive.” (Mehan, 2011). He provides historical examples of how certain nations have achieved the command of the sea, demonstrating that complete command is hardly ever achievable. Corbett also argued as early as 1911 that it was the use of the sea rather than its possession that was important (Corbett, 2008).  So, the idea of command of the sea needs to be viewed theoretically, like Clausewitz’s analogies between the idealized and theoretical forms of warfare and the realities of war (Armstrong, 2015). This inability to achieve command has led to the development of the notions of “sea control” and its counterpart, “sea denial” as more practical strategic goals.

Sea denial describes a situation where a naval force effectively stops an enemy from using a particular region for its own objectives. While the denying force may not necessarily have complete control over the region, this tactic focuses on restricting the enemy’s freedom of movement in the marine domain, which reduces their operational effectiveness (Miller, 2006).
Sea control refers to the ability of a naval force to exercise freedom of action in a maritime area, allowing it to use the sea for its purposes while denying its use to adversaries. Sea control is important as it enables power projection, littoral operations and maintaining a presence which is required for influencing events on land and shaping the operating environment.

In regions such as the South China Sea, control over key maritime areas is still critical for projecting power and securing national interests. The rise of China as a naval power, as demonstrated by China’s militarization of artificial islands (Seidel, 2024) and its claims over the South China Sea (Speller, 2022), has led to renewed interest on these concepts. Similarly, Russia’s renewed assertiveness along its maritime frontiers highlights the importance of denying adversaries access to strategic waters, especially in the context of great power competition (Speller, 2022). While the principles of control and denial remain relevant, the methods employed to achieve them have evolved, influenced by modern technologies such as drones, and cyber capabilities.

Modern insurgencies and the increasing role of non-state actors in global conflicts are another new challenge to traditional maritime strategy. Insurgent groups often operate in coastal areas or use maritime routes for smuggling and logistics. Groups, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hezbollah, and Houthi rebels, have demonstrated relatively sophisticated sea denial tactics, including successful attacks on large maritime targets. These groups have used asymmetric tactics to disrupt state naval operations, using missile attacks, small boat raids, and mines (Speller, 2022) as a means of controlling the sea lanes adjacent to their territory, keeping them free of hostile vessels (Asal et al., 2022). By attacking state vessels in their declared “territory” and “policing” access of foreign or non-belligerent vessels an insurgent group can progress a claim to sovereignty and demonstrate its resolve and strength to the internatio9nal community (Kydd and Walter, 2006).

The rise of modern insurgent groups has led many to question whether sea control and power projection are still effective in dealing with such threats. While navies remain critical for securing sea lanes and deterring state adversaries, they must now contend with the threat of “hybrid attacks,” which operate in the grey area between war and peace. Their role in combating non-state actors and insurgencies requires new approaches, such as closer cooperation with coast guards and other maritime agencies and an increasing focus on protecting sea lines of communication, ensuring freedom of navigation in contested waters and focusing on strategic choke points (Miller, 2006).

 The technological innovations of the twenty-first century have significantly altered the landscape of naval warfare. The development of unmanned systems, including drones and autonomous submarines, has expanded the capabilities of modern navies, allowing them to project power more effectively while reducing the risks to personnel, additionally, advances in cyber warfare have introduced new threats to maritime security, as naval forces must now contend with cyberattacks that target critical infrastructure, such as satellite communications and navigation systems.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the most interesting new developments for maritime warfare. The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) relies heavily on artificial intelligence. According to (Schwab, 2017) the 4IR is defined by the use of cutting-edge technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, the Internet of Things (IoT), and advanced materials, to develop new systems and procedures that are more intelligent, efficient, and connected. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the creation of computer systems that are capable of learning, solving problems, and making decisions—tasks that typically require human intelligence. Numerous 4IR technologies, like advanced robots and driverless cars, depend on artificial intelligence.

One of the most notable technologies enabled by 4IR are unmanned systems. Unmanned systems are held up as the future of naval warfare (Clark and Walton, 2019). The US Department of Defence, for instance, predicts that autonomous and semi-autonomous unmanned systems will be able to detect, track, recognize, target, counter, and engage targets at sea, in the air, as well as land either individually or in cooperation. However, there are still a lot of technical obstacles to overcome, and even though unmanned autonomous technology is spreading quickly, the practical barriers are still very high (Bowers and Kirchberger, 2021). These difficulties do not imply that unmanned systems are useless, relatively cheap and primitive examples have been deployed successfully by Ukraine, denying full control of the Black Sea to Russia (Mackintosh, 2024). Rather, the full development of the technology will take time.

Due to “globalization,” the significance of safeguarding marine trade routes has only grown. The strategic significance of the seas in the twenty-first century is demonstrated by the fact that more than 80% of international trade is now carried out by sea, that pipelines are used to distribute resources, and that underwater cables are used to carry internet traffic worldwide (Till, 2013). The requirement for strong and resilient naval forces to safeguard these trade routes and infrastructure continues to be a top priority for superpowers as geopolitical tensions rise, especially in areas like the South China Sea.

To tackle these issues, navies have embraced “post-modern” assignments that prioritize collaboration with allied navies to tackle global issues. Strategies like the United States’ “Co-operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” which calls for international marine alliances to establish a cooperative naval presence frequently referred to as a “1,000 ship navy” the strategy highlights the importance of power projection and maritime security. It aims to enhance global stability and secure freedom of navigation through innovative technologies and a robust strategic sealift capability while countering irregular and transnational threats such as piracy and terrorism. (Conway et al., 2008)

 The concept of power projection remains fundamental to maritime strategy. Navies continue to serve as instruments of state power, capable of influencing events on land and at sea. Aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and other naval assets enable states to project force far from their own shores, providing a visible symbol of military strength and deterrence. Power projection also plays a role in diplomacy, as naval forces can be used for humanitarian missions, disaster relief, and other non-combat operations that enhance a state’s global influence. As geopolitical rivalries intensify in regions from the Indo-Pacific to the artic (Brown and Pensack, 2018), the ability to project naval power remains crucial for maintaining a balance of power and deterring potential adversaries (Till, 2013).

In conclusion, despite the modern developments changing the dynamics of conflict and the global security environment, the fundamental principles of maritime strategy are still relevant in the twenty-first century. Modern naval doctrine is still based on the fundamental ideas established by strategic theorists such as Mahan and Corbett, who emphasized the importance of power projection, sea control, and the defence of maritime trade routes. These underlying concepts are just as important now as they were last century.  

Over 80% of world trade by volume is carried out through maritime channels because of ongoing globalization demonstrating the strategic significance and ongoing relevance of maritime trade route protection. Strong naval forces that can effectively counter both conventional state-based threats and emerging ones such as terrorism, cyberwarfare, and piracy are essential given how dependent we are on these routes for both national security and economic stability.

Technological developments pose both opportunities and challenges in the maritime conflict environment. Unmanned systems and artificial intelligence are examples of technology that can improve naval capabilities but also present supplementary threats that navies must engage with. Geopolitical conflicts in areas such as the Arctic and the South China Sea emphasize the necessity for flexible approaches that can react to rapidly changing circumstances.

Ultimately, maritime strategy needs to be able retain its fundamental objectives while being able to adapt to changing circumstances. The future of maritime strategy depends on the successful integration of old-style principles with modern innovations so that navies can effectively safeguard the vital arteries of global commerce in an ever increasingly interconnected and contested world.

References

Armstrong B (2015) D – All of The Above: Connecting 21st Century Naval Doctrine to Strategy. Infinity Journal 4(4): 13–17.

Asal V, Hastings J V. and Rethemeyer K (2022) Maritime Insurgency. Terrorism and Political Violence 34(6). Routledge: 1102–1124.

Bowers I and Kirchberger S (2021) Not so disruptive after all: The 4IR, navies and the search for sea control. Journal of Strategic Studies 44(4). Routledge: 613–636.

Brown A and Pensack M (2018) The NSA’s Role in a Climate-Changed World: Spying on Nonprofits, Fishing Boats, and the North Pole. Available at: https://theintercept.com/2018/08/15/nsa-snowden-documents-climate-change/ (accessed 10 October 2024).

Mackintosh T (2024) Ukraine war: Kyiv Says Seven Dead as Drone Attack Sinks Russian Ship. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68477318 (accessed 15 October 2024).

Clark B and Walton AT (2019) Taking Back the Seas: Transforming the U.S. Surface Fleet for Decision-Centric Warfare. Available at: https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/taking-back-the-seas-transforming-the-u.s-surface-fleet-for-decision-centric-warfare (accessed 27 October 2024).

Conway JT, Roughead G and Allen TW (2008) A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Naval War College Review 61(1).

Corbett J (2008) Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy. In: Strategic Studies. Routledge, pp. 132–244.

Kydd AH and Walter BF (2006) The Strategies of Terrorism. International Security 31(1): 49–80.

Mehan AT (2011) The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. Read Books Ltd.

Miller M. H (2006) Aspirational Concepts and Their Impact on Classical Maritime Theories. Australian Defence Force Journal 171: 96–107.

Schwab K (2017) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. London: Penguin Books.

Seidel J (2024) Satellite Photos Reveal Beijing’s Huge Plan for South China Sea. Available at: https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/satellite-photos-reveal-beijings-huge-plan-for-south-china-sea/news-story/852318580feb12552073e602a69d811d (accessed 26 October 2024).

Speller I (2022) Modern Maritime Strategy and Naval Warfare. In: Routledge Handbook of Maritime Security. Routledge, pp. 49–61.

Strachan H (2013) The Meaning of Strategy: Historical Perspectives. In: The Direction of War. Cambridge University Press, pp. 26–45.

Till G (2013) Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.

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ISIS Recruits: Religious Warriors or Useful Fools?

The question about the degree to which religion influences acts of terrorist violence is often raised concerning the concept of “religious terrorism,” This essay will investigate the complex relationship between religion and terrorism through an analysis of ISIS recruitment methods, illuminating the various motivations and influences of these violent acts. Are ISIS recruits religious warriors or a modern version of the useful fools of the Cold War era?

We conclude that religion is often used as a motivator for front-line terrorists; however, their recruitment is based on manipulation and misinformation, while their leaders have more down-to-earth political goals. As a result, the front-line and suicide terrorists do seem comparable to the “useful idiots” who were recruited by the KGB during the Cold War and considered to be expendable once their utility ended; however, there is a significant difference in that while the useful fools were mostly unaware of the results of their actions ISIS recruits, though manipulated do eventually make a concise decision to carry out acts of terrorism.

To carry out this analysis, we must first define religious terrorism and differentiate it from other forms of terrorist violence. We will then briefly examine the phenomena of the “useful fool” as ascribed to the KGB during the Cold War. Next, we examine the recruitment methods used by ISIS, focusing on how it recruits English-speaking Muslims and fighters from the West.

ISIS was chosen for this analysis as it has been shown to still have an active recruitment and propaganda arm that provides a case study from 2022 and 2023. We will determine the role of religion as a motivating factor in terrorism and the influence of political aims on religiously motivated terrorism.

In Western scholarship, the idea of “religious violence” and its implication that religion and violence are inextricably linked has a long history (Cavanaugh, 2004). However, David Rapoport’s influential article analysing the use of terror in the three monotheistic religions is where a more precise term, “religious terrorism,” originated (Gunning & Jackson, 2011). From this foundation, scholars such as Juergensmeyer, Sageman, and Hoffman have elaborated on the concept of  ”religious terrorism,” assigning traits and substantive assertions that delineate it as a particular “type” of political violence that is fundamentally distinct from earlier or other forms of terrorism. Religious terrorism “represents a very different and possibly far more lethal threat than that posed by more familiar, traditional terrorist adversaries,” according to (Hoffman, 2017) it results from radically different value systems, validation mechanisms, moral concepts, and worldviews. He says that the most important distinguishing feature of contemporary terrorism is the religious imperative. One significant repercussion of this apparent turning point in terrorism is that it renders analysis of terrorism based on established groups obsolete (Gunning & Jackson, 2011)

“Traditional” terrorism is characterized by easily recognizable organizations like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Irish Republican Army (IRA). These organizations support one class or ethnic group over another or have specific grievances. These groups attack specific targets with conventional weapons and explosives to humiliate or harm the state or group they are waging war against. They (typically) specifically avoid needless bloodshed, at times alerting authorities to bombings in public places (Tendler, 1996). This is done in order to maintain a position in succeeding governments and be considered an eligible participant in negotiations in the future (Simon & Benjamin, 2001).

Martin describes the New Terrorism as based on cell-based networks that can act independently. They are prepared to use high-intensity weapons and asymmetrical tactics that maximize causalities and have hazy, frequently apocalyptic religious motivations (Martin, 2008). The use of cells creates an amorphous grouping of organizations under an umbrella franchise, such as Islamic State or al Qaeda. This reduces reliance on state sponsorship, allowing the groups to be much less restrained in their attacks than traditional terrorist organizations (Morgan, 2004). The final distinction between traditional and modern terrorists, according to (Martin, 2008), is how well they manipulate the media and use the Internet.

By providing a moral justification, per the terrorist worldview, for actions that would otherwise revolt most people, modern terrorist groups have increased their threat by using religious identity. This is a result of the demographic that the terrorists are targeting. Religious terrorists see themselves as outsiders seeking to replace the entire world order. In contrast, traditional terrorists aim to bring about a change in a system that is seen as generally good but in need of correction. Due to the religious terrorist’s need to purge everyone except fellow believers, more lethal weapons can be used in attacks because winning over supporters is not the primary objective (Hoffman, 2017). This focus on religion as a foundation of new terrorism has led some countries, Australia included, to include a ‘religious cause’ component to their anti-terror legislation whereby in order to bring charges for a terrorist act, the act must have a religious, ideological, or political cause (Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s100.1) (Jabri Markwell, 2023).

Useful fool” or sometimes “useful idiot” is a term used to describe someone cynically being used by the leaders of a cause. The term, which is falsely attributed to Vladimir Lenin, was frequently used during the Cold War to refer to non-communists, sympathetic to communism, who were regarded by Russian intelligence as naive and, therefore, could be manipulated to unknowingly support the strategies of the KGB (Treguer, 2021). These individuals were often recruited because they were naive, gullible, or had strong ideological beliefs aligned with the Soviet Union’s interests.

The KGB used a variety of methods to recruit and manipulate useful fools. One common method was to target individuals who were already involved in left-wing political organizations or movements. These individuals were often attracted to the Soviet Union’s promises of social justice and equality. The KGB would also target individuals who had access to sensitive information, such as journalists, government officials, and academics (Treguer, 2021). Their “usefulness” lay in spreading or legitimizing communist ideologies, often in democratic or capitalist settings, without being directly connected to or controlled by communist parties. Thus, the supposed “Russian attitude” towards these “useful idiots” was one of utilitarian value: they were useful and disposable tools to further the Soviet cause abroad (Naylor, 2021).

The self-declared Pan-Islamic Caliphate Islamic State or ISIS is a Sunni extremist organization with roots in northern Iraq and Syria. At its height in 2014, the Islamic State ruled over sizable portions of both nations, absorbing the bureaucracy and resources of the governments as well as business and industry. The last Islamic State territory in Iraq and Syria was lost in March 2019 (Australian Government, 2023). As a result, the Islamic State has since reverted to conventional terrorist tactics in the region, including areas within Turkey, with increasing ferocity and tactical sophistication.

 As of 2022 – 2023, through satellite entities that are operationally active within designated “provinces” (Wilayat), Islamic State continues to maintain a strong presence worldwide. These include the Abu Sayyaf Group, IS-East Asia, IS-Sinai, IS-Libya, IS Somalia IS-Khorasan Province, and IS West Africa Province, all of which are designated terrorist organizations under the Criminal Code of Australia (Australian Government, 2023). Despite the fact that the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS in Iraq and Syria has significantly decreased as a result of the group’s territorial losses and the growing difficulty of traveling to the region, ISIS has continued to recruit and in recent years has urged potential recruits to travel directly to other ISIS strongholds or remain in their home countries to carry out attacks as part of its global campaign. (Australian Government, 2023).

In these recruitment efforts, the Islamic State presents itself as the embodiment of true Islam as practiced by the first generations of Muslims (Salafism), and it primarily draws on Wahhabism, a particularly strict form of Salafism. The organization is skilled at fostering and utilizing already-existing sectarian rifts in the Middle East. The Islamic State uses religious and racial prejudice to recruit followers and justify its actions or to win over support and defeat those who actively oppose it (Hassan, 2019).

It should be noted, however, that Islamic religious authorities have rejected ISIS’s attempts to connect Islam to its actions. In 2014 and 2015, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al Sheikh, declared that ISIS and Al Qaeda are “Islam’s number one enemy” highlighting that extremism, militancy, and terrorism have nothing to do with Islam. The actions of ISIS against Christians in Mosul were deemed un-Islamic in 2014 by the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq, deeming them contrary to the Prophet Mohammed’s teachings regarding the relationship with the “People of the Book” (Christians, Jews). Over 120 academics and Islamic scholars also found that ISIS had committed over 20 Islam-related offenses (Wilson Center, 2015).

 At its height in 2014, ISIS seized control of roughly 40% of Iraq and 60% of Syria. Additionally, it drew more than 40,000 foreign fighters from more than 130 nations into its ranks. ISIS terrorized people in the areas it seized and carried out terrorist attacks worldwide, including Sydney, Jakarta, Brussels, New York, Istanbul, London, Nice and Paris. More than 14 affiliates in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia also joined ISIS’s global network (Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020). The recruitment of Westerners and English-speaking Muslims by ISIS has been a significant concern for counterterrorism efforts. The strategies and factors used in this recruitment are outlined below.

Online Propaganda and Social Media: ISIS has successfully spread its message and attracted new members using social media and online propaganda platforms (Johnston, 2022; Awan, 2017; Badawy & Ferrara, 2018). These platforms enable ISIS  to connect with a global audience, target particular demographics, and customize their messages using various languages, including English, Arabic, Russian, and others (Ibrahim & Shi, 2019). Welch found that ISIS propaganda materials’ use of videos, images, and narratives was particularly effective at luring recruits (Welch, 2018). Online platforms’ capacity to foster a sense of community and belonging has also been a key component of recruitment efforts (Badawy & Ferrara, 2018).

Narratives and Ideology: ISIS propaganda often employs powerful narratives that appeal to individuals’ psychological predispositions and desires for heroism, justice, and belonging (Yoder et al., 2020; Welch, 2018). The narratives highlight the establishment of a caliphate, the defence of Islam, and the promise of a utopian society (Rane & Courty, 2020). By framing their actions as part of a larger ideological struggle, ISIS targets individuals who may feel marginalized, disenchanted, or alienated from their societies. The manipulation of religious symbols and the conflation of Islam and Islamist ideology in propaganda materials further contribute to the appeal of ISIS among Western Muslims (Rane & Courty, 2020). ISIS employs sophisticated strategies to manipulate information and shape public opinion. This includes the dissemination of false narratives, framing techniques, and the use of violent and shocking imagery to instil fear and attract attention (Mahood & Rane, 2016; Ibrahim & Shi, 2019). By exploiting grievances and perceived injustices, ISIS seeks to present itself as a viable alternative and a force for change (Shorer, 2018).

Targeting Vulnerable Individuals: ISIS has shown a particular interest in targeting vulnerable individuals, including young adults and women (Cottee & Cunliffe, 2018; Shorer, 2018). Video games, social networks, and chat rooms allow ISIS to establish relationships and engage in stage-by-stage relational development with potential recruits, sometimes called grooming. The promise of adventure, purpose, and a sense of belonging can appeal to individuals who may feel marginalized or disconnected from their communities (Abumelhim et al., 2022). The recruitment of women by ISIS has also been facilitated through the manipulation of gender roles and the promise of empowerment (Shorer, 2018). Perhaps most egregious, their recruitment strategies online have included deliberately targeting people with specific mental health disorders (such as autism spectrum disorder) with the aim of stimulating them to commit lone-wolf terrorist attacks (Lennings et al., 2010).

As noted above, the results of these methods were a specular success in the early days of the Caliphate, and even though ISIS is significantly weakened, they are still being used today. ISIS differs from other militant Islamist groups in that it was born during the internet era, when people, especially young adults, feel like the world is smaller and more connected than ever.

ISIS uses a variety of methods to lure recruits, including face-to-face recruiting on the ground, cold calling online, and using friends and family networks. The latter involves recruiters using swarming and love-bombing tactics to get in touch with people who support ISIS propaganda by liking, retweeting, sharing, or otherwise responding to ISIS social media recruitment. The recruiters lavishly court them and going out of their way to make them feel special in an effort to persuade them to join the group.  Others draw recruits by involving them in political and religious discussions meant to start them down the ISIS pathway (Lennings et al., 2010). Some recruits made friends over the Internet with those who had joined and travelled to the battlefield and were encouraged by these new friends to do the same. The common thread through these recruitment methods was the misrepresentation of Islam and the realities of life in the Caliphate in order to convince their new ”friends” to travel and join ISIS.

When speaking with ISIS members on the Internet or viewing ISIS propaganda, most men and women recruited anticipated a much more positive experience than they had. ISIS portrayed hijrah, the allegedly required Islamic migration to the Caliphate to live under sharia law, as a way to find personal significance, purpose, and belonging while upholding Islamic principles, living in prosperity, and enjoying protection. They neglected to mention the brutal penalties for disobedience, the fact that ISIS could accuse and punish anyone for any reason at any time, the fact that men would be forced to fight for the organization whether they wanted to or not, the fact that women would need to remarry in succession if their husbands were killed, and the fact that once a person joined, they could not leave. Thus, the recruiters presented an idealistic Islamic state, and those who travelled explicitly to join ISIS had gone with the expectation of realizing some utopian dream that, in the end, was radically dissimilar from the idealized state they had been sold (Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020).

Can the argument be made that front-line terrorists or those that “self-radicalise” are comparable to useful fools? Although there are distinct differences between ISIS recruits and the idea of “useful fools,” similarities between the two can be found. Both ‘useful fools’ and ISIS recruits are susceptible to manipulation techniques that skew their worldview and affect their decisions. ISIS recruiters strategically motivate potential members, presenting an image of purpose, belonging, and adherence to Islamic principles, whereas ‘useful fools’ are manipulated by ideologies without necessarily being aware of their role or impact. They propagate perspectives or ideologies inadvertently, being valuable for their influence rather than direct action. However, the core difference lies in the level of involvement and ideological commitment. ISIS recruits consciously choose a path of terrorism based on their manipulated ideological convictions, often expecting a particular outcome, whereas ‘useful fools’ play their part unknowingly, spreading ideologies without complete awareness of the agendas they serve. Therefore, while both are victims of manipulation, the level of consent, awareness, and active participation differentiate ISIS recruits from ‘useful fools.’

In this paper, we have defined religious terrorism and differentiated it from other forms of terrorist violence. We then briefly examined the role of the “useful fool” during the cold war before moving on to analyse the recruitment methods used by ISIS following their loss of territory. The still active recruitment efforts provide a case study from 2022 – 2023.

By comparing and contrasting the motivations of ISIS recruits with the “useful fools” of the Cold War, we conclude that while religion plays a crucial role, functioning as a powerful motivator and recruiting tool for many terrorist cells, it is primarily used as a shield or justification for more terrestrial, political objectives. Recruit experiences reinforce this assertion, revealing that behind many religiously framed calls to action or violence, there lie strategic misinformation and earthly political aims of the leaders. In contrast, recruits are often less interested in the religious aspect than in fulfilling more basic needs. Lastly, modern media manipulation techniques have increasingly blurred the lines between religious conviction and political ambitions. Consequently, our understanding of ‘religious terrorism’ needs to evolve, acknowledging that religion is not the sole instigator but a component of a larger construct involving political, sociological, and psychological elements.

REFERENCES

Abumelhim, M.H., Radaideh, R.M. & Abu-Alkeshek, E.O. (2022) ‘Sociology of Terrorism: A Brief History and Overview of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) Propaganda Wing From a  Socio-Educational Perspective’, Journal of Educational and Social Research,

Australian Government (2023) Islamic State. [Online] [online]. Available from: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state (Accessed 23 September 2023).

Awan, I. (2017) ‘Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social Media’, Society,

Badawy, A. & Ferrara, E. (2018) ‘The Rise of Jihadist Propaganda on Social Networks’, Journal of Computational Social Science,

Cavanaugh, W.T. (2004) THE VIOLENCE OF ‘RELIGION’: EXAMINING A PREVALENT MYTH.

Cottee, S. & Cunliffe, J. (2018) ‘Watching ISIS: How Young Adults Engage With Official English-Language ISIS Videos’, Studies in Conflict &Amp; Terrorism,

Gunning, J. & Jackson, R. (2011) ‘What’s so “religious” about “religious terrorism”?’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4(3), pp. 369–388.

Hassan, H. (2019) ‘The Sectarianism of the Islamic State. Ideological Roots and Political Context’, in Beyond Sunni and Shia: The Roots of Sectarianism in a Changing Middle East. [Online]. New York,YN: Oxford University Press.

Hoffman, B. (2017) Inside Terrorism. New York,YN: Columbia University Press.

Ibrahim, D.A. & Shi, Y. (2019) ‘The ISIS’ Discourse From the Rise to the Collapse: Analysis of ISIS’ Discourse Through Films “Flames of War I &Amp; II”’, Media Watch,

Jabri Markwell, R. (2023) ‘Religion as a Motive – Does Australian Terrorism Law Serve Justice?’, International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy,

Johnston, N. (2022) ‘Selling terror: a multidimensional analysis of the Islamic State’s recruitment propaganda’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 76(2), pp. 194–218.

Lennings, C.J., Amon, K.L., Brummert, H. & Lennings, N.J. (2010) ‘Grooming for terror: The internet and young people’, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 17(3), pp. 424–437.

Mahood, S. & Rane, H. (2016) ‘Islamist Narratives in ISIS Recruitment Propaganda’, The Journal of International Communication,

Martin, Gus. (2008) Essentials of terrorism : concepts and controversies. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.

Morgan, M.J. (2004) ‘The Origins of the New Terrorism’, Parameters (Carlisle, Pa.), 34(1), pp. 29–43.

Naylor, A. (2021) Russia, Explained: Putin’s ‘Useful Idiots’. [Online] [online]. Available from: https://cepa.org/article/russia-explained-putins-useful-idiots/ (Accessed 26 September 2023).

Rane, H. & Courty, A. (2020) ‘The Caliphate Wants You! Conflating Islam and Islamist Ideology in Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Recruitment Propaganda and Western Media Reporting’, in Propaganda and Public Relations in Military Recruitment. [Online]. Routledge. pp. 192–206.

Shorer, M. (2018) ‘Mobilization of Women to Terrorism: Tools and Methods of ISIS’, International Annals of Criminology,

Simon, S. & Benjamin, D. (2001) ‘The Terror’, Survival, 43(4), pp. 05–18.

Speckhard, A. & Ellenberg, M.D. (2020) ‘ISIS in their own words: Recruitment history, motivations for joining, travel, experiences in ISIS, and disillusionment over time-Analysis of 220 in-depth interviews of ISIS returnees, defectors and prisoners’, Journal of Strategic Security, 13(1), pp. 82–127.

Tendler, S. (1996) ‘IRA May End Bomb Warnings’, The Times, 11 March.

Treguer, P. (2021) ‘USEFUL IDIOT’: MEANING AND ORIGIN. [Online] [online]. Available from: https://wordhistories.net/2021/03/26/useful-idiot/ (Accessed 26 September 2023).

Welch, T. (2018) ‘Theology, Heroism, Justice, and Fear: An Analysis of ISIS Propaganda Magazines<i>Dabiq</I>and<i>Rumiyah</I>’, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict,

Wilson Center (2015) Muslims Against ISIS Part 1: Clerics & Scholars. [Online] [online]. Available from: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/muslims-against-isis-part-1-clerics-scholars (Accessed 27 September 2023).

Yoder, K.J., Ruby, K., Pape, R.A. & Decety, J. (2020) ‘EEG Distinguishes Heroic Narratives in ISIS Online Video Propaganda’, Scientific Reports,

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The Battle of Midway (1942)

Battle of Midway WWII – Specifics

Date: June 4 -7 1942

Place: On and around Midway Atoll 28°12′N 177°21′W

Event: American ambush of Japanese carrier forces

Result: American Victory

Commanders:

Losses:

In June 1942 the Battle of Midway marked an important turning point in World War Two. During the battle aircraft for the American carriers Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise ambushed and destroyed a significant portion of the Japanese Navy’s carrier force. The battle is considered a significant example of how intelligence can be applied to any level of warfare.

The main reason given for the American victory is most often the breaking of the Japanese codes by U.S. navy intelligence. However further study of the battle shows this to be a simplistic view that ignores several further levels of intelligence successes and failures that contributed to the outcome. The fact that the code breakers we able to do their jobs so well is really just the tip of a fairly complicated iceberg that included deception, surveillance, reconnaissance and development of effective intelligence processes. The battle of midway is a story of intelligence being used to achieve surprise. It is further interesting because it is one of the few instances where the intended victims (American forces) were able to avoid and then actually inflict surprise on their attackers (Markam, 1993, p. 5).

In analysing this event we can observe the effects of several intelligence fields on the outcome, these include cryptography / signals intelligence (SIGINT), deception, and dissemination I will go into more detail on each of these below.

 Deception:

Deception was used or attempted by both sides on the Midway battle. Firstly Midway was not actually the objective, the objective was to lure the remaining American carriers into a pitched battle where they could be overwhelmed by the Japanese fleet. The capture of Midway was supposed to be the bait. The Japanese also sent a force to attack the Aleutian Islands as a feint. (Markam, 1993, pp. 16-17)

Nimitz was also using deception, he made sure that the carer Enterprise was seen by the Japanese near the East Solomons before it returned to Pearl Harbor. He also made use of smaller ships broadcasting on aircraft carrier frequencies to make it look like some of the carriers we in the Coral Sea (Markam, 1993, pp. 16-18)  it was due to these efforts that let the Japanese to the conclusion that they had achieved surprise and that any type of attack on their forces was unlikely. (Tully & Lu, 2015, p. 87)

The most famous use of deception at Midway involves tricking the Japanese into confirming Midway as the target. In May not everyone was convinced that Midway was a target. Codebreakers could only indicate that a major operation was in the works against some place the Japanese only referred to as “AF”.  In order to confirm a message was sent via an undersea cable (un-tappable by the Japanese) instructing Midway to report that they were having problems with their desalination plant, and were running short on water, the message was to be sent in the clear which virtually guaranteed that it would be intercepted. A few days later a message was decrypted reporting that “AF” was running low on water confirming midway as “AF” and the target. (McDermott & Bar-Joseph, 2016, p. 960)

Cryptography and SIGINT:

The heart of the Battle of midway story is of course the breaking of the Japanese Navy’s JN-25 code by SIGINT analysts at Station Hypo. By March 1942 they were reporting daily on hundreds of navel intercepts. Due to the fact that some Japanese commander used outdated codebooks the American listeners were able to capture transmissions using both old and new codes allowing for faster cracking of new cyphers. The Japanese did eventually change their codes however by that time the Americans had practically all of Yamamoto’s battle plans, strategy and transit dates and were in a position to lay a trap of their own. (Elder, n.d.)

The Japanese seem to have been somewhat cavalier in their implementations of cyphers. Often leaving them in place longer then they should. They were of the opinion that even if the cypher were broken the complexities of the Japanese language would make translating impossible. This of course is nonsense as the Navy had started hiring fluent Japanese speakers and experts in Japanese culture to assist in their codebreaking. (Tucker, 2015, p. 84)

Dissemination and Acceptance

The importance of dissemination and the acceptance by the consumer of intelligence product cannot be underestimated. Markam tells us that in evaluating intelligence success or failure we need to keep in mind whether it was the “intelligence system” that failed or did the consumer fail to make use of the resulting product (Markam, 1993, p. 10)

After the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 the war in the Pacific had been going badly for America. The turnaround at Midway was achieved by Joe Rochefort dramatically improving the quality of intelligence product and then being able to convince Admiral Chester Nimitz that the intelligence analysis his team was producing was trustworthy.

 Joe Rochefort was put in charge of Station Hypo, the naval cryptography division at Pearl Harbor as part of a post Peral Harbor overhaul of Navy’s Intelligence services. Rochefort was an expert on Japan as well as an experienced cryptanalyst. It was Rochfordts teams work during the battle of the Coral Sea that gave Nimitz the confidence to trust Rochefort over the often conflicting assessments he would often get from the Washington based intelligence services. (Dahl, 2013, p. 83).

The Japanese had issues with their dissemination, given that they were operating under radio silence there were several missed opportunities for them to be warned that they had lost the element of surprise. Tully and Yu show us that the Japanese went into battle with an extremely limited picture of what the Americans were doing and though they made reasonable decisions based on the intelligence they possessed this could not save them from the reality in which they found themselves. (Tully & Lu, 2015, p. 95)

Impact:

The victory at Midway was confirmation that the reforms introduced after Pearl Harbor were effective. Just six months earlier the U.S had suffered a crushing defeat due largely to failures in its intelligence systems. By re-establishing the intelligence units with experts not only in cryptography but also language and culture they were able to vastly improve their intelligence product. This basic model is still in use today. The battle of Midway demonstrated any early example of what is now called “battlespace awareness”  and it was by improving on this that enabled the U.S to claim victory later during the Battle of the Philippine Sea. (Donovan & Mack, 2014).

References

Alcala, R. W., 1995. Effective Operational Deception: Learning the Lessons of Midway and Desert Storm.. Newport: Naval War College.

Anon., n.d. Totally History. [Online]
Available at: http://totallyhistory.com/battle-of-midway/
[Accessed 29 03 2017].

Barde, R. E., 1983. Midway: Tarnished Victory. Military Affairs: The Journal of Military History, Including Theory and Technology, 47(4), pp. 188-192.

Dahl, E. J., 2013. Why Won’t They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence At Pearl Harbor and Midway. Intelligence and National Security, 28(1), pp. 68-90.

Donovan, P. & Mack, J., 2014. Code Breaking in the Pacific. London: Springer.

Elder, G., n.d. Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive. Studies in Intelligence, 50(2).

Markam, S. A., 1993. Intelligence And Surprise: The Battles Of Midway, Newport: Naval War College.

McDermott, R. & Bar-Joseph, U., 2016. Pearl Harbor And Midway: The Decisive Influence Of Two Men On The Outcomes. Intelligence and National Security, 31(7), pp. 949-962.

Tucker, S. C., 2015. Pearl Harbor: The Essential Reference Guide. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

Tully, A. & Lu, Y., 2015. A Question Of Estimates: How Faulty intelligence Drove Scouting At The Battle of Midway. Naval War College Review, 68(2), pp. 85-99.

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