Question 1. Consider the following statement:

“Understanding intelligence analytical processes and approaches will make little difference in the future, as manufactured intelligence tools and artificial intelligence will make the informed analyst largely irrelevant.”

Do you agree with this statement? Why/Why not?

Response:

An understanding of intelligence and analytical processes is considered a fundamental skill of any intelligence analyst. Indeed, one definition of intelligence is information that has been subjected to the intelligence cycle (Lowenthal, 2016, p. 1). The introduction of manufactured intelligence tools and artificial intelligence (AI) will automate some of the steps of the process however they will not replace the requirement for an informed analyst who can then use their skills to interpret the output of these tools. This answer will provide a definition of the intelligence cycle and the place of analytical process within it. It will then examine the role of manufactured intelligence tools concentrating of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) as an example.

The intelligence process or cycle consists of five steps Planning, Collection, Processing, Analysis / Production and Dissemination (Johnson, 2007, p. 366). This is a simplified view as in reality many of the steps have feedback loops however we can use this as a framework (Johnson, 1986, p. 1).  It is at the Analysis step that different analytical approaches are used. Diagnostic techniques such as a Key Assumptions Check are used to identify assumptions or intelligence gaps.  Contrarian techniques such as Devils Advocacy challenge current thinking and Imaginative Thinking such as Brainstorming can be used to find new insights and develop different perspectives (United States, Gov., 2009, p. 9).

Manufactured intelligence tools and AI are used primarily in the collection and collation phases of the intelligence cycle most notably in handling of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) (Hagen, 2013, p. 3). OSINT is generally unclassified information or information that is otherwise available to the public. While OSINT is not limited to electronic sources it is against these sources and the massive amount of data they produce that manufactured intelligence tools can be deployed with greatest effect. Tools such as Artificial Neural Networks and can be used to mine the data and flag relevant markers for further investigation (Carroll, 2005, pp. 2-3).

While automated tools are increasingly able to identify suspect patterns what may indicate criminal, terrorist or espionage activity an analyst is still required to put these signals into context. In order to provide context an analyst needs to have some knowledge of the social and cultural background of the information they are working with. They need to understand how people think, their world view their goals and objectives (Hall & Citrenbaum, 2009, p. 1). They are also required to disseminate this information in a form that is useful and relevant to the customer. It is at these phases of the intelligence cycle that manufactured tools or AI are not able to replace a trained analyst as they are non-rule based decisions.

With the advent of the world wide web, social medial and other modern sources of intelligence it is only natural for tools to be developed that will assist making sense of the massive amount of data created, to find the intelligence needle in a massive haystack. However, the product of these tools will still require the input of an informed analyst who can provide context.

References

arroll, J. M., 2005. OSINT Analysis Using Adaptive Resonance Theory For Counterterrorism Warnings.. Artificial Intelligence and Applications, pp. 756 – 760.

Hagen, L., 2013. Methods And Tools For Automated Data Collection And Collation of Open Source Information, Ottawa: Defence R&D Canada – CORA.

Hall, W. M. & Citrenbaum, G., 2009. Intelligence Analysis: How To Think in Complex Environments. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

Johnson, L. K., 1986. Making The Intelligence “Cycle” Work. International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 1(4), pp. 1 – 23.

Johnson, L. K. ed., 2007. Handbook Of Intelligence Studies. New York: Routledge.

Lowenthal, M. M., 2016. Intelligence: From Secrets To Policy. Washington DC: CQ press.

United States, Gov., 2009. A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques For Improving Intelligence Analysis. :CIA Center For The Study Of Intelligence.

Question 2 (10 marks, 500 words +/- 10%)

Consider the following statement:

“By far, the most important thing to happen to intelligence since the beginning of the Cold War is technological advancement.”

Is this claim accurate? Why or why not?

Response:

While this claim is accurate in that technological advances have been important to the intelligence field my answer will show that an over reliance on technology can be detrimental to intelligence operations.

The Cold War was an extended period of tension and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Beginning at the end of World War Two until the end of the 1980’s trillions of dollars were spent by both sides to develop weapons and spy on their enemies. The advances in technology brought about by this expenditure initiated significant change in the way intelligence is collected with a move toward technological methods, particularly by western agencies. This reliance on technology however has also resulted in intelligence failures due to an absence of Human Intelligence (HUMINT).

HUMINT is intelligence gathered through “traditional” espionage usually involving sending clandestine operatives to target countries in order to recruit spies of collect information. These operatives can have diplomatic cover which provides them some protection if they are discovered. Another type of HUMINT resource is the –non-official, they may operate as businessmen or some other cover but run more of a risk as they will not be recognised as diplomats should they be discovered (Margolis, 2013, p. 45).

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) which includes communications, electronic and telemetry intelligence is the interception of electronic communications (Turner, 2006, p. 183). Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), also called imagery intelligence is information derived from images from satellites, aircraft or radar regarding any object that can be observed on the earth and has security implications (Lowenthal, 2016, p. 88). It is these latter two disciplines that benefited most from the technological advance of the cold war.

As a result of the technological advances during and since the Cold War western intelligence agencies, particularly the United States have focused on technical methods of gathering intelligence while neglecting traditional human espionage. This lack of HUMINT deprives analysts of clarity regarding intensions and capabilities. It also leaves the door open to counterintelligence operations (Turner, 2006, p. 50).

Some examples of intelligence operations that highlight the importance of HUMINT include Operation Gold, a wiretapping operation in East Berlin. Probably exposed by British mole George Blake it’s possible the Soviets were feeding the West false information from the very beginning (Margolis, 2013, p. 51). The Cuban Missile Crisis starts as a classic example of technology driven intelligence when U-S spy planes showed that missiles had been deployed by the Soviets. However, it was HUMINT provided by Soviet colonel Oleg Penkovsky regarding the missiles assembly time that gave Kennedy the confidence to seek a diplomatic solution (Margolis, 2013, p. 52). 

One of the most important developments in intelligence collection has been the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAE’s) or drones. UAVs can be equipped to collect the entire cross section of electronic intelligence at relatively low cost and risk. (Jameson, 2007). UAE’s can also be used for “signature strikes” striking a target because the activity taking place appears to be terrorist related. Without HUMINT confirmation these strikes can risk hitting innocents with all of the resulting political fallout.

This response has explored the technological advances since the Cold War started and conclude that while they have been most important to the intelligence field they should not be used on their own. Overlooking HUMINT can be detrimental even in this day and age.

References

Jameson, H., 2007. Drones Between Satellite And Earth. (Drone satcom). [Online]
Available at: https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-173229598.html
[Accessed 10 June 2017].

Lowenthal, M. M., 2016. Intelligence: From Secrets To Policy. Washington DC: CQ press.

Margolis, G., 2013. The Lack Of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem. Global Security Studies, 4(2), pp. 46-60.

Turner, M. A., 2006. Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc..

Question 3 (10 marks, 500 words +/- 10%)

Consider the following statement:

“The priority that the Australian Intelligence Community places on combating terrorism is not justified.”

Do you agree with this statement? Why/Why not?

Response:

Terrorism has been Australia’s top national security concern for several years. Considered a real and evolving risk Australian intelligence agencies have had their capabilities expanded and new legislation has been enacted to meet this threat (Ferguson, 2014).  This answer will show that given the persistence that terrorist groups have demonstrated, their ability to continually recruit despite setbacks on the battlefield and adapt to changing conditions that this prioritisation is justified.

The terrorist threat to Australia is rising and becoming harder to combat. The symptoms of this can be observed in the increasing number of Australians joining overseas extremist groups and the global trend toward low tech attacks unusually carried out by loan actors recruited over the internet. These attacks are particularly hard to combat as there can be few signs of planning and only a short time between a perpetrator forming an intent and carrying out their actions (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015, p. 4).  

The main source of the terrorist threat to Australia comes from people who follow a militant interpretation of Islam, calling for violence in response to grievances perceived or real. This narrative postulates that western powers led by the USA are systemically exploiting and repressing Muslims and that governments in Muslim majority countries are corrupt or un-Islamic. The solution is to remove western influence and establish a “true Islamic” system of government. In order to do this, it is the religious duty of all true Muslims to attack the enemies of Islam anywhere in the world (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010, p. 16).

The international situation, with the rise of ISIL and the civil war in Syria are further reinforcing these extremist narratives and groups are now expert at using social media the publish glossy propaganda material which is increasingly appealing to the Australian community. Groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra post videos of fighters rescuing civilians from Assad regime snipers, implying a life of heroism and adventure appealing to young viewers who may be looking of a direction in life (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015, p. 34).

A further threat can be seen in the number of Australians traveling to the Middle East to train with or join Jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. These fighters will quite possibly pose a threat once they returned home with dangerous skills and violent ideology Europe has already seen multiple attacks carried out by returning foreign fighters. In 2014 a fighter who had trained in Syria killed four people at the Jewish museum in Belgium and at least one of the Charlie Hebdo attackers had trained with al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen (Zammit, 2015, p. 4).

This answer has explored several reasons that the terrorist threat in Australia deserves the high priority it has been given. These reasons include the resilience of the groups involved, their ability to adapt tactics their improved propaganda and the continuing threat of violence carried out by returning overseas fighters.

References

Commonwealth of Australia, 2010. Counter Terrorism White-Paper Securing Australia | Protecting our Community 2010. [Online]
Available at: https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/basic_pages/documents/counter-terrorism-white-paper.pdf
[Accessed 09 June 2017].

Commonwealth of Australia, 2015. Review or Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery. [Online]
Available at: https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/190215_CT_Review_0.pdf
[Accessed 11 June 2017].

Ferguson, S., 2014. Homegrown Terrorism Australia’s Main National Security Concern Says Julie Bishop. [Online]
Available at: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2014/s4061539.htm
[Accessed 09 June 2017].

Zammit, A., 2015. Australian Foreign Fighters: Risks and Responses. [Online]
Available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/australian-foreign-fighters-risks-and-responses.pdf
[Accessed 07 June 2017].

The post PICX210 – Intelligence and Counter Intelligence – Final Exam appeared first on That Freaky NewGuy.

The idea that any organisation can be error free sounds like a pipe dream when first considered. The kneejerk responses referring to Murphy’s Law and the Titanic being declared unsinkable usually come up in any ensuing conversation. However, there are some organisations that deal with high risk situations or products where any errors could have catastrophic consequences that have, on examination, had remarkably few accidents. This paper examines these highly reliable organisations and the possibility of attaining the ultimate goal of error free operations. We will look briefly at the various theories pertaining to High-Reliability Organisations (HROs) and examine their common characteristics. We will then critically investigate the question that HROs can ever truly be error free. We conclude that there is no possible way for error-free organizations to exist, due to individuals and organizations’ inherent fallibility. However, it is important to keep in mind that HRO theory provides a framework in which errors can be anticipated and damage contained so that these organizations are safer and more resilient.

There are two dominant schools of thought that try to explain what causes accidents in complex, high-risk organizations: Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and High Reliability Organisation Theory (HROT) (Lekka 2011). More recently the concept of Resilience Engineering (RE) has also become popular with safety scientists (Hopkins 2014). However there is a lot of overlap between the concepts put forward by RE and the principals of HROT (Lekka 2011) so much so that, as (Le Coze and Dupre 2006) and others have done, this paper will deal with both concepts as more or less interchangeable.

According to Perrow’s theory of normal accidents, accidents are inevitable in complex organisations that operate high-risk technologies. In particular, Perrow contends that there are several major characteristics which make accidents in complex high-risk organisations practically inevitable (Perrow 1984). These features include tight coupling and interactive complexity. Tight coupling refers to the amount of interdependence between a system’s components such as people, equipment and processes Interactive complexity refers to the extent to which the interactions among the system’s components are unexpected and invisible. For instance, a system is considered tightly coupled where one process follows rapidly or invariably from another, these are generally highly automated systems with little or no chance for human intervention (Hopkins 1999). Because these tasks or processes are often interdependent, a failure that occurs in one part of the system has the potential to quickly cascade to other parts of the system. The presence of these characteristics means that there is insufficient time and knowledge (due to the system’s complexity) to fully understand and intervene in potential failures (Perrow 1984). Perrow suggests that where systems are tightly coupled, complex and in a high risk organisation accidents are inevitable (Hopkins 1999).  Perrow went on to classify systems such as nuclear weapons and aircraft into high-risk categories. On the other hand, manufacturing plants such as oil refineries and chemical plants were classified as lower-risk categories (Lekka 2011).

HROT has gained popularity in academia and the “real world” having been used in the investigation of the Columbia space shuttle explosion and the Buncefield Incident in the UK among many others (Hopkins 2014). Some of its concepts have also bee incorporated into other frameworks such as the ITIL Service Management framework. Early HRO research focused on an originations ability to maintain an error free record over long periods of time (Roberts 1990) however the field of study has evolved and now looks more closely at how HROs manage their risks through organisational control of hazards and probability (Rochlin 1993). (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001) describe a model by which HROs manage their risks through five processes, these include preoccupation with failure, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise (particularly in a crisis).

The concepts behind the HRO perspective and the principals of resilience engineering overlap extensively (Lekka 2011). Resilience engineering has been applied across several industries, including the aviation, petrochemical, and nuclear industries. (Nemeth and Cook 2007) define resilience is as ‘the ability of systems to survive and return to normal operations after encountering a challenge’. Wreathall includes in his definition of resilience an organization’s ability to maintain a safe mode of operation and resume normal operations after an incident occurs (Lekka 2011). Thus, an organization’s ability to restore operations to normalcy is an essential trait of resilience.

The question of whether HROs can ever be error free needs to be examined with the above theories / frameworks in mind. Each of these theories has their own drawbacks when applied to real world situations. If one were to only apply NAT to the question the answer would be an automatic “no” as the theory states that errors/ accidents are unavoidable.

NAT as put forward by Perrow states that a system tightly coupled and complex enough will inevitably experience an accident, this will happen regardless of how well the system is managed (Perrow 2011).  The problem with this is that is fails to take into account that many systems are in fact badly managed. Perrow himself states that most of the major accidents of the past decade or so have resulted from such mundane reasons as poor maintenance, cost pressures, negligence or incompetence (Perrow 1994). Perrow uses the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor as his model for a complex tightly coupled system and the reactors near meltdown is his example of a natural accident (Perrow 1984). However, Hopkins points out that there were in fact several incidents before the accident which could have served as barriers as described in James Reasons Swiss Cheese Model (Reason 1997), proper reporting and action taken at any of these points would have prevented the accident (Hopkins 2001) thus its was not inevitable at all. NAT has been further criticised as being too limited in the its definitions of complexity and tight coupling as well as the narrow scope of organisations it applies to (Lekka 2011) furthermore while trying to explain causes of accidents it does little to suggest how these types of accidents can be prevented (Hopkins 1999)

Given the shortcomings of the theory we cannot answer our question reliably using NAT as a framework. The narrow scope, focus on causation and pronouncements of inevitability render it an inadequate tool for our purpose.

Looking at the question through the lens of HROT and RE provides a different perspective that is focused on understanding the conditions whereby complex systems do not fail and is informed by research in technologically complex organisations that are able to sustain high levels of safety performance. HRO researchers argue that accidents are not inevitable because processes can be put in place that can significantly lower the probability of and contain catastrophic errors (La Porte and Consolini 1998). HROT argues that organisations can improve their reliability and resilience by engineering a positive safety culture that embraces inquiry, bottom up communications, fault reporting, a just culture and management commitment to safety. Significantly HROT and RE perspectives acknowledge that failures will occur and instead have a focus on learning from incidents and “near misses” in order to improve processes. In this way accidents can either be avoided completely by early intervention at a lower level of the Swiss Cheese model or the effects can be contained to less than disastrous levels (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 1999).

The HROT / RE lens is more realistic and useful to real world situations in that it recognises that organisations are dynamic in nature, that failures can occur that are not catastrophic and offers a framework to reduce the risk of accidents. In using HROT to in relation to our question the answer would have to be “No, but…”. HROT does not profess to make organisations error free. Instead it provides a framework whereby potential failures can be anticipated, contained and recovered from in a timely manner. It should be noted that the HRO model is an ideal that (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001) admit no real organisation could completely live up to due to social, environmental or political implications (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 1999).

Our analysis of NAT and HROT in relation to producing error free organisations has shown that NAT is an unsuitable model as it automatically assumes that disasters are inevitable in complex organisations and provides no guidance as to preventing them. HROT and RE similarly assume that error will occur but also provides a theoretical framework that organisations can try to implement that will help anticipate and more importantly contain the effects of errors to a less than catastrophic level. While it is acknowledged that no organisation could completely live up to the HROT /RE models, even partial implementation is better than nothing in a world where anything that can go wrong, will go wrong.

References

Hopkins, A. 2014. “Issues In Safety Science.” Safety Science 67: 6-14.

Hopkins, A. 1999. “The Limits Of Normal Accident Theory.” Safety Science 32: 93-102.

Hopkins, A. 2001. “Was Three Mile Island A ‘Normal Accident’?” Journal of Contingencies And Crisis Management 9 (2): 65-72.

La Porte, T, and P Consolini. 1998. “Theoretical and Operational Challenges of ‘High Reliability Organisations’: Air Traffic Control and Aircraft Carriers.” nternational Journal of Public 21 (6-8): 847-852.

Le Coze, Jean-Christophe, and Michele Dupre. 2006. “How to Prevent a Normal Accident in a High Reliable Organisation ? The Art of Resilience, a Case Study In The Chemical Industry.” Resilience engineering. Juan-les-Pins, France. 181-190. Accessed 10 13, 2022. https://hal-ineris.archives-ouvertes.fr/ineris-00973243.

Lekka, Chrysanti. 2011. High Reliability Organisations: A Review Of The Literature. Health and Safety Executive, 1-34.

Muhren, Wilem J, Gerd Van Den Eede, and Bartel Van de Walle. 2007. “Organizational Learning for the Incident Management Process: Lessons from High Reliability Organizations.” ECIS 2007 Proceedings. 65. Accessed 10 20, 2002. https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2007/65/

Nemeth, C, and R Cook. 2007. “Reliability Versus Resilience: What Does Healthcare Need?” Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 51 (11): 621-625.

Pedram, Shiva , Pascal Perez, and Bruce Dowsett. 2013. “Assessing The Impact Of Virtual Reality-Based Training On Health And Safety Issues In The Mining Industry.”

Perrow, C. 1984. Normal accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies. New York: Basic Books.

Perrow, C. 1994. “The Limits Of Safety: The Enhancement Of A Theory Of Accidents.” Journal of Contingencies And Crisis Management 2 (4): 212-220.

Perrow, C. 2011. The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities To Natural, Industrial And Terrorist Disasters. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Reason, J. 1997. Managing The Risks of Organizational Accidents. Aldershot: Ashgate. Accessed 10 12, 2002.

Roberts, K. 1990. “Some Characteristics Of One Type Of High Reliability Organisation.” Organization Science 5 (2): 160-176.

Rochlin, Gene I. 1993. “Defining “High Reliability” Organizations In Practice: A Taxonomic Prologue.” New challenges To Understanding Organizations 11: 32.

Weick, K E, K M Sutcliffe, and D Obstfeld. 1999. “Organizing For High Reliability: Processes of Collective Mindfulness.” Research in Organizational Behavior 1: 81-124.

Weick, Karl E, and Kathleen M Sutcliffe. 2001. “Managing the Unexpected: Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity.” JosseyBass, a John Wiley & Sons Inc. Company.

The post PCIX2013 – Can High-Reliability Organisations Ever Be Error Free? – Crisis Management and Disaster Relief – Final Essay appeared first on That Freaky NewGuy.

In 2009 the Australian government published its Defence White Paper stating that for many decades Australia and the Asia Pacific region had been enjoying an era of stability and peace largely as a result of the strategic primacy of the United States. Ominously it goes on to say that the rise of China is shrinking the power gap between the US and China and is a threat to US primacy. It goes on to say that as the US is increasingly tested there is a ‘concerning possibility of growing confrontation” between the powers (Australian Government 2009, p. 49). This thinking gave rise to papers such as John Mearsheimers The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia (Mearsheimer 2010) that warn of impending great power conflict in the region and inspired Graham Allison to write first an essay and then book that coin the phrase Thucydide’s Trap to describe the conflict caused by a rising power disrupting the status quo (Allison 2015), (Allison 2017).

Thucydide’s Trap refers to the ancient Greek historian (and general) best known for his work Histories of the Peloponnesian War. Allison uses the quote “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” And it is through this lens that Allison focuses on U.S.-China relations portraying China as the ambitious rising power and the U.S. as the hegemon unwilling to give up its position. His conclusion is that direct conflict between the U.S. and China is all but inevitable without major efforts toward peace by both sides.

This paper examines two debates around the concept of Thucydides’ Trap. Firstly, we look at whether the theory is an accurate depiction of the cause of conflict. Wars start for many reasons does the Trap theory provide a broad enough perspective for reasonable analysis? Secondly we examine if Allison’s analogy between the Athens – Sparta conflict and U.S.-China relations is an historically apt one. Are the power dynamics as similar as made out or could other forces be a play that need to be included in any analysis?

Our conclusion is that while the Thucydides trap metaphor is a generally useful device to focus attention on the U.S.-China situation a general sense. It is not terribly historically accurate and analysts should beware of its simplistic approaches to a complex topic.

Is Thucydidies’ Trap Too Simple?

The popular description of the Trap is quite simple. Basically a metaphor for power transition theory it focuses on a single factor, the overtaking of a hegemon by a rising power, to explain interstate war in this case the Peloponnesian War.  However, as Chan points out the historical analogy comparing the U.S. to the authoritarian state of Sparta and China to democratic Athens is somewhat ironic and the claim that war becomes “inevitable” as the rising power catches up to the dominant power is a rainbow connection that ignores some 2500 years of developments such as the modern state system, nuclear weapons and nationalism. He goes on to claim that the nature of American democracy would preclude them from launching a preventative war against China (Chan 2019, pp. 12-13).

Continuing to examine the causes of conflict through the Peloponnesian lens Jaffe tells us that the causes of the war were not solely due to an external structural necessity but include the intricate cultural and psychological responses unique to the belligerents (Jaffe 2017) and Chan goes on to speculate that factors such as armament races, economic characteristics, alliances and leader’s personalities also play a role (Chan 2019, p. 15).

Allison does address some of these issues in Destined for War however the use of the “Rise of Athens” line to define Thucydides’ Trap has in some cases led to an overly simplistic view of IR and can lead to analysts falling into the trap of attributing monocausal explanations to what is usually a complex situation.

Different Power Dynamics

Thucydides describes the Athenian rise to power in the first book of History (Collingwood 1830).  After the Persian Wars Athens exploited a maritime alliance to exert control over its allies, demanded tribute and violently suppressed any defection or decent. It embarked in a campaign to coerce other Greek city-states to join its “alliance” the Delian League. These activities began to encroach on Sparta’s sphere of influence provoking the Spartans to declare war. This description of the conflicts origins is at odds with the current U.S.-China relationship. Frideberg argues that while China does seek some form of regional hegemony it does not pursue conquest over its neighbours (Friedberg 2011, p. 157).  (Lee 2019, p. 76) tells us that despite concerns regarding the build-up of influence from the One Belt One Road program it would be an exaggeration to claim that China was aiming to reduce other countries to imperial vassals. While the situation could change the evidence so far indicates that the U.S is facing a very different strategic challenge than what Sparta faced so long ago.

Of further concern regarding the power dynamics in play are the differences in how war is perceived by the belligerents. Eckstein tells us that war in ancient Greece was common and considered a legitimate, normal course of action. Society today approaches war with far greater caution with greater regard to its costs in life and wealth. Unbridled aggression is not considered a legitimate method of resolving disputes (Eckstein 2017).

While these differences in power dynamics do not preclude the possibility of war they cast some doubt on the all-encompassing nature of the Thucydides Trap theory and its use of the Peloponnesian War as a metaphor for the current U.S.-China situation. 

Conclusion

Allisons use of the Thucydides’ Trap metaphor to draw attention to the potential for Chinas rise to lead to great power conflict provides a valuable lens through which to observe the current U.S.-China relationship. One needs to keep in mind however that while the comparison may be relevant in a general sense, a deeper and more encompassing analysis is required to get a true picture of the situation.

More from Security Studies

References

Allison, G., 2015. The Thucydides Trap: Are The US And China Headed For War?.. The Atlantic, 24(9).

Allison, G. T., 2017. Destined for war : Can America And China Escape Thucydides’s trap?. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Australian Government, 2009. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030. [Online]
Available at: http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf
[Accessed 3 July 2021].

Chan, S., 2019. More Than One Trap: Problematic Interpretations And Overlooked Lessons From Thucydides. Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 24, pp. 11-24.

‘BOOK I: CHAPTER IV: From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War – The Progress from Supremacy to Empire’ (1830) in History of the Peloponnesian War. S. Collingwood, pp. 30–38. Available at: https://search-ebscohost-com.simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lfh&AN=34346743&site=ehost-live (Accessed: 1 May 2022).

Eckstein, A. M., 2017. Thucydides, International Law and International Anarchy. In: R. K. Balot, S. Forsdyke & E. Foster, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides. New York, NY.: Oxford University Press.

Friedberg, A., 2011. A Contest For Supremacy: China, America, And The Struggle For Mastery In Asia. New York: Norton.

Jaffe, S. N., 2017. Thucydides On The outbreak Of War: Character And Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lee, J., 2019. Did Thucydides Believe in Thucydides’ Trap? The History of the Peloponnesian War and Its Relevance to U.S.-China Relations. Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 24, pp. 67-86.

Mearsheimer, J. J., 2010. The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 3, pp. 381-396.

The post An Examination of the Thucydides’  Trap Metaphor As Used by Graham Allison in “Destined For War” appeared first on That Freaky NewGuy.

The Relevance of Traditional Concepts of Maritime Strategy in the Twenty-First Century

The nature of maritime warfare is in a near constant state of evolution and has most recently been reshaped by technological developments, globalization, and the rise of non-state actors. This paper examines the resulting debates regarding the continued relevance of “traditional” concepts of maritime strategy, particularly those established by figures such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. These traditional ideas were produced in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries as an answer to state-centric conflict and large-scale naval battles. However they now seem to be disconnected from the realities of contemporary conflicts which increasingly involves modern elements such as insurgencies and cyber warfare.

This paper argues that even with these recent changes, the core principles of maritime strategy, sea control, power projection, and the protection of maritime trade, remain relevant. This paper will explore the relevance of traditional maritime strategy by examining its foundational principles, the impact of modern technological and geopolitical shifts, and how navies have adapted to new forms of conflict.

Alfred Mahan’s seminal work on “sea power” was first published in 1890 (Mehan, 2011). His theories emphasized the critical role of naval superiority which would enable a nation to dominate international trade routes and leverage this control to dominate global politics (Speller, 2022). Sir Julian Corbett published his theories is 1911 (Corbett, 2008). His theories highlight the importance of cooperation between naval and land forces and the strategic use of maritime power as a subset of national strategy. This emphasis on broader strategic objectives that recognises the limitations of naval power offers a contrast to Mahan’s focus of decisive battles (Strachan, 2013). These theories have shaped naval thinking for over a century however are they still applicable in today’s geopolitical context?

Command of the sea is the first topic to be discussed in every naval strategy debate. Command of the sea “is one of those ringing phrases that dominates the imagination but confuses the intellect,” according to naval historian Geoffrey Till (Till, 2013). while Mahan is often given credit for the concept, practically every prominent naval scholar has written on it. The objective of sea power and the establishment of sea command, according to Mahan, is “the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it or allows it to appear only as a fugitive.” (Mehan, 2011). He provides historical examples of how certain nations have achieved the command of the sea, demonstrating that complete command is hardly ever achievable. Corbett also argued as early as 1911 that it was the use of the sea rather than its possession that was important (Corbett, 2008).  So, the idea of command of the sea needs to be viewed theoretically, like Clausewitz’s analogies between the idealized and theoretical forms of warfare and the realities of war (Armstrong, 2015). This inability to achieve command has led to the development of the notions of “sea control” and its counterpart, “sea denial” as more practical strategic goals.

Sea denial describes a situation where a naval force effectively stops an enemy from using a particular region for its own objectives. While the denying force may not necessarily have complete control over the region, this tactic focuses on restricting the enemy’s freedom of movement in the marine domain, which reduces their operational effectiveness (Miller, 2006).
Sea control refers to the ability of a naval force to exercise freedom of action in a maritime area, allowing it to use the sea for its purposes while denying its use to adversaries. Sea control is important as it enables power projection, littoral operations and maintaining a presence which is required for influencing events on land and shaping the operating environment.

In regions such as the South China Sea, control over key maritime areas is still critical for projecting power and securing national interests. The rise of China as a naval power, as demonstrated by China’s militarization of artificial islands (Seidel, 2024) and its claims over the South China Sea (Speller, 2022), has led to renewed interest on these concepts. Similarly, Russia’s renewed assertiveness along its maritime frontiers highlights the importance of denying adversaries access to strategic waters, especially in the context of great power competition (Speller, 2022). While the principles of control and denial remain relevant, the methods employed to achieve them have evolved, influenced by modern technologies such as drones, and cyber capabilities.

Modern insurgencies and the increasing role of non-state actors in global conflicts are another new challenge to traditional maritime strategy. Insurgent groups often operate in coastal areas or use maritime routes for smuggling and logistics. Groups, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hezbollah, and Houthi rebels, have demonstrated relatively sophisticated sea denial tactics, including successful attacks on large maritime targets. These groups have used asymmetric tactics to disrupt state naval operations, using missile attacks, small boat raids, and mines (Speller, 2022) as a means of controlling the sea lanes adjacent to their territory, keeping them free of hostile vessels (Asal et al., 2022). By attacking state vessels in their declared “territory” and “policing” access of foreign or non-belligerent vessels an insurgent group can progress a claim to sovereignty and demonstrate its resolve and strength to the internatio9nal community (Kydd and Walter, 2006).

The rise of modern insurgent groups has led many to question whether sea control and power projection are still effective in dealing with such threats. While navies remain critical for securing sea lanes and deterring state adversaries, they must now contend with the threat of “hybrid attacks,” which operate in the grey area between war and peace. Their role in combating non-state actors and insurgencies requires new approaches, such as closer cooperation with coast guards and other maritime agencies and an increasing focus on protecting sea lines of communication, ensuring freedom of navigation in contested waters and focusing on strategic choke points (Miller, 2006).

 The technological innovations of the twenty-first century have significantly altered the landscape of naval warfare. The development of unmanned systems, including drones and autonomous submarines, has expanded the capabilities of modern navies, allowing them to project power more effectively while reducing the risks to personnel, additionally, advances in cyber warfare have introduced new threats to maritime security, as naval forces must now contend with cyberattacks that target critical infrastructure, such as satellite communications and navigation systems.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is one of the most interesting new developments for maritime warfare. The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) relies heavily on artificial intelligence. According to (Schwab, 2017) the 4IR is defined by the use of cutting-edge technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, the Internet of Things (IoT), and advanced materials, to develop new systems and procedures that are more intelligent, efficient, and connected. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the creation of computer systems that are capable of learning, solving problems, and making decisions—tasks that typically require human intelligence. Numerous 4IR technologies, like advanced robots and driverless cars, depend on artificial intelligence.

One of the most notable technologies enabled by 4IR are unmanned systems. Unmanned systems are held up as the future of naval warfare (Clark and Walton, 2019). The US Department of Defence, for instance, predicts that autonomous and semi-autonomous unmanned systems will be able to detect, track, recognize, target, counter, and engage targets at sea, in the air, as well as land either individually or in cooperation. However, there are still a lot of technical obstacles to overcome, and even though unmanned autonomous technology is spreading quickly, the practical barriers are still very high (Bowers and Kirchberger, 2021). These difficulties do not imply that unmanned systems are useless, relatively cheap and primitive examples have been deployed successfully by Ukraine, denying full control of the Black Sea to Russia (Mackintosh, 2024). Rather, the full development of the technology will take time.

Due to “globalization,” the significance of safeguarding marine trade routes has only grown. The strategic significance of the seas in the twenty-first century is demonstrated by the fact that more than 80% of international trade is now carried out by sea, that pipelines are used to distribute resources, and that underwater cables are used to carry internet traffic worldwide (Till, 2013). The requirement for strong and resilient naval forces to safeguard these trade routes and infrastructure continues to be a top priority for superpowers as geopolitical tensions rise, especially in areas like the South China Sea.

To tackle these issues, navies have embraced “post-modern” assignments that prioritize collaboration with allied navies to tackle global issues. Strategies like the United States’ “Co-operative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” which calls for international marine alliances to establish a cooperative naval presence frequently referred to as a “1,000 ship navy” the strategy highlights the importance of power projection and maritime security. It aims to enhance global stability and secure freedom of navigation through innovative technologies and a robust strategic sealift capability while countering irregular and transnational threats such as piracy and terrorism. (Conway et al., 2008)

 The concept of power projection remains fundamental to maritime strategy. Navies continue to serve as instruments of state power, capable of influencing events on land and at sea. Aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and other naval assets enable states to project force far from their own shores, providing a visible symbol of military strength and deterrence. Power projection also plays a role in diplomacy, as naval forces can be used for humanitarian missions, disaster relief, and other non-combat operations that enhance a state’s global influence. As geopolitical rivalries intensify in regions from the Indo-Pacific to the artic (Brown and Pensack, 2018), the ability to project naval power remains crucial for maintaining a balance of power and deterring potential adversaries (Till, 2013).

In conclusion, despite the modern developments changing the dynamics of conflict and the global security environment, the fundamental principles of maritime strategy are still relevant in the twenty-first century. Modern naval doctrine is still based on the fundamental ideas established by strategic theorists such as Mahan and Corbett, who emphasized the importance of power projection, sea control, and the defence of maritime trade routes. These underlying concepts are just as important now as they were last century.  

Over 80% of world trade by volume is carried out through maritime channels because of ongoing globalization demonstrating the strategic significance and ongoing relevance of maritime trade route protection. Strong naval forces that can effectively counter both conventional state-based threats and emerging ones such as terrorism, cyberwarfare, and piracy are essential given how dependent we are on these routes for both national security and economic stability.

Technological developments pose both opportunities and challenges in the maritime conflict environment. Unmanned systems and artificial intelligence are examples of technology that can improve naval capabilities but also present supplementary threats that navies must engage with. Geopolitical conflicts in areas such as the Arctic and the South China Sea emphasize the necessity for flexible approaches that can react to rapidly changing circumstances.

Ultimately, maritime strategy needs to be able retain its fundamental objectives while being able to adapt to changing circumstances. The future of maritime strategy depends on the successful integration of old-style principles with modern innovations so that navies can effectively safeguard the vital arteries of global commerce in an ever increasingly interconnected and contested world.

References

Armstrong B (2015) D – All of The Above: Connecting 21st Century Naval Doctrine to Strategy. Infinity Journal 4(4): 13–17.

Asal V, Hastings J V. and Rethemeyer K (2022) Maritime Insurgency. Terrorism and Political Violence 34(6). Routledge: 1102–1124.

Bowers I and Kirchberger S (2021) Not so disruptive after all: The 4IR, navies and the search for sea control. Journal of Strategic Studies 44(4). Routledge: 613–636.

Brown A and Pensack M (2018) The NSA’s Role in a Climate-Changed World: Spying on Nonprofits, Fishing Boats, and the North Pole. Available at: https://theintercept.com/2018/08/15/nsa-snowden-documents-climate-change/ (accessed 10 October 2024).

Mackintosh T (2024) Ukraine war: Kyiv Says Seven Dead as Drone Attack Sinks Russian Ship. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68477318 (accessed 15 October 2024).

Clark B and Walton AT (2019) Taking Back the Seas: Transforming the U.S. Surface Fleet for Decision-Centric Warfare. Available at: https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/taking-back-the-seas-transforming-the-u.s-surface-fleet-for-decision-centric-warfare (accessed 27 October 2024).

Conway JT, Roughead G and Allen TW (2008) A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. Naval War College Review 61(1).

Corbett J (2008) Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy. In: Strategic Studies. Routledge, pp. 132–244.

Kydd AH and Walter BF (2006) The Strategies of Terrorism. International Security 31(1): 49–80.

Mehan AT (2011) The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. Read Books Ltd.

Miller M. H (2006) Aspirational Concepts and Their Impact on Classical Maritime Theories. Australian Defence Force Journal 171: 96–107.

Schwab K (2017) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. London: Penguin Books.

Seidel J (2024) Satellite Photos Reveal Beijing’s Huge Plan for South China Sea. Available at: https://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/military/satellite-photos-reveal-beijings-huge-plan-for-south-china-sea/news-story/852318580feb12552073e602a69d811d (accessed 26 October 2024).

Speller I (2022) Modern Maritime Strategy and Naval Warfare. In: Routledge Handbook of Maritime Security. Routledge, pp. 49–61.

Strachan H (2013) The Meaning of Strategy: Historical Perspectives. In: The Direction of War. Cambridge University Press, pp. 26–45.

Till G (2013) Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century. 3rd ed. London: Routledge.

The post PICT2021 – Modern Warfare – Research Essay appeared first on That Freaky NewGuy.

Propaganda and information warfare are tools that have been used by actors in political conflicts throughout history. Most recently, there has been great focus on the propaganda created by groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State focusing on their high quality productions, internet presence and use of social media. However the War On Terror features propaganda and information warfare use on both sides of the conflict. In an effort to learn why political actors would use these tools this report explores the history of propaganda and information warfare use in political conflict. Then by studying their employment by both sides of the War on Terror find some of the motivations for their employment in political conflict.

When we talk about political actors, we need to consider that we do not just mean nation states and their associated politicians. Political actors are persons or entities who have obtained some measure of political power or authority in a particular society and are thus able to have a significant influence on policies and outcomes associated with a given conflict. Such entities would include not only politicians but also NGOs, insurgent / terrorist groups such as the Taliban, Islamic State or Al-Qaeda or even criminal gangs such as the Mexican Cartels.[1]

Nicholson describes conflict as the state of disagreement or opposition between two or more people; this can be extrapolated to mean two or more groups that do not have a consensus and are therefore on a collision course in the pursuit of irreconcilable goals[2]. In the case of political conflict Jenog tells us that it is the condition where two or more groups take part in a dispute over claims to power, status or resources with the aim to neutralize or eliminate their opponents thus political conflict is a demonstration of cross-purposes of political groups which often leads to political conflict[3]. Political conflict may be expressed through violence, diplomacy, economic pressure or subversion however as Smith tells us a key attribute is the use of words images and ideas in the form of propaganda and psychological warfare[4].

Propaganda and information warfare are terms that are often misused to refer to any form of persuasive communication issued by a state, bringing up images of Nazi films depicting Jews as vermin and state controlled newspapers trumpeting the German armies “noble sacrifice” after their defeat at Stalingrad, neglecting to mention that ninety thousand had been taken into captivity[5]. This paper will use the term ‘propaganda’ to refer to messaging designed to influence the behavior and attitudes of a target audience to achieve politico-military ends during conflict[6]. While generally believed to involve lies propaganda can be based on fact or ‘truth’ and propaganda based on facts is considered the most effective and persuasive.

Referred to as ‘rhetoric’ by the ancient Greeks, propaganda has been used extensively since well before the 20^th century to further various political and religious agendas by highlighting the negative or positive aspects of an idea, person or state. Propaganda can take the form of music, art, speeches or other types of media. It can also incorporate actions or “propaganda by deed” these can be benevolent activates like building schools to win the trust of a population or acts of violence intended to draw attention to a cause, attract recruits and encourage media coverage through shock value[7].

For the purpose of analysis, propaganda can be divided into different classifications the first being between black, white and grey. Black propaganda is covert, possibly from a false source and often consists of lies. White propaganda is overt, mostly accurate and comes from a known source. Grey propaganda falls between the two extremes where there is uncertainty of either the source or accuracy of the information.[8]

The term Information Warfare covers a number of areas of modern conflict such as computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception and information security[9]. The definition from the Institute for the Advanced Study of ‘Information Warfare’ is:

“…the offensive and defensive use of information and information systems to exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary’s information and information systems, while protecting one’s own. Such actions are designed to achieve advantages over military or business adversaries”[10]

For the purposes if this paper, we will focus on the aspects of PSYOPs and military deception as they pertain to the use of propaganda by all sides in the War on Terror.

On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four passenger jets and crashed them into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon (the fourth was overrun by passengers and crashed on its way to a target in Washington, DC) Almost 3,000 people were killed in the coordinated attack unprecedented on American soil. In the aftermath, the United States has struggled to find a balance between national security and civil rights while engaging in what became its longest-lasting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The events of 9/11 and the consequent “War on Terror” revived long-standing stereotypes in the United States that portrayed Muslims as fundamentally different from other Americans[11]

Days after the 9-11 attacks, President George W. Bush declared to congress:

“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”

By October 20, 2001, a coalition including Australia, Britain, Turkey, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, France and Poland deployed to Afghanistan and ground operations had commenced against Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets. By December 7, 2001, the last Taliban holdouts at Kandahar had fallen. In February of 2002, terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda kidnapped New York Times journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan later posting a video of his beheading on the internet, the first of many beheading videos to follow. On March 19, 2003, Coalition forces invaded Iraq claiming that they had intelligence proving the country was in possession of and developing weapons of mass destruction. On the 1^st May, 2003, President Bush gave his “Mission Accomplished” speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln stating that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. On August 19, 2003, a suicide bomber drove a truck bomb into the UN headquarters in Baghdad killing 23 people and injuring 100. On December 13, 2003, U.S forces captured Saddam Hussein, he was then executed on December 30, 2006[12].

The timeline above outlines the beginning of the conflict that has come to be called the “War on Terror” ongoing even twenty years later and spanning the globe the conflict has seen the continuous occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq while the U.S dominated coalition attempt to install stable governments while battling increasingly sophisticated insurgencies. Below we will examine some of the propaganda techniques used by both sides of the conflict to determine why they were used and how effective they were.

The use of propaganda or information warfare by political  actors is usually done to carry out, public diplomacy and / or psychological operations. Public diplomacy is conducted openly by civilians to a wide audience it can be considered international political promotion. It targets civilians and seeks to elicit popular support for policies beneficial to those deploying it usually is support of negotiations via diplomatic channels.  Military personnel in pursuit of military objectives conduct psychological operations. PSYOPS usually targes hostile military personnel but could include neutrals or civilians[13]. Below we will examine some examples of public diplomacy and psychological operations as used by both sides of the War on Terror.

Days after the 9-11 attacks President Bush was warning the world that it was facing a “new kind of evil” and likening the war on terrorism to a “crusade” a word deeply symbolic in Muslim history. The war on terror rhetoric of Us vs. Them was used as a model by states around the world to legitimise strategic and policy decisions on a national and global scale. Bin Laden was able to re-frame this rhetoric as a call to arms for by focusing on the “evident Crusader hatred in this campaign against Islam” He pointed out that Bush had “stated clearly that this is a Crusader war[14]” This co-option of Bushes own published words was a valuable tool for recruitment to the Islamist cause. The ‘War on Terror’ paradigm would eventually be discontinued as clumsy and easy to counter rhetorically[15]  particularly by modern terrorists.

Bin Ladens ability to turn the “crusade” comment back on the US and successfully use it in later recruitment campaigns indicates that the coalition was dealing with a new kind of terrorist. Martin describes “New Terrorism” as groups that have vague, religious and often apocalyptic motivations. These groups’ use asymmetric methods to inflict maximum casualties with no distinction between military or civilian targets; they are also recognised for their skills in internet use and media manipulation[16]. For example by timing the strikes on the World Trade Centre approximately forty-five minutes apart the planners were able to ensure that news organisations had time to break in to their normal programming and deploy their cameras, guaranteeing that millions of people would witness the second plane strike[17]. There are also reports from journalists kidnapped in Iraq that their abductions were simply “attention seeking” acts carried out for the sole purpose of putting a particular militia group in front of the cameras. The journalists expressed their frustration with their editorial bosses who focused on these “kidnappings” over stories about the plight of ordinary Iraqis living through the conflict thus giving the militias free “publicity”

This embrace of the media and digital technology is best demonstrated in the rise if the Islamic State and their “cyber jihadist” campaign presenting brutal and extreme images including (but by no means limited to) decapitations, crucifixions, burnings, running over people with tanks and even making toddlers carry out executions. This content, produced with an unusually high level to technological skill including high definition video and cutting-edge post-production effects made this propaganda extremely effective. The millions of views and international interest generated by decapitation videos are testament[18].

One of the main aims of this campaign was legitimising the use of violence against infidels, this was done by presenting it as revenge for crimes committed against Islamists for example publishing pictures of women and children killed in an American air strike on a convoy said to have been transporting the families of Islamic State militants. The graphic production of these atrocities against Muslims along with the statement:

“The crusaders justify such actions for themselves – alone – under the pretence of ‘collateral damage’ while denouncing others for ‘terrorism.’ Nine women and five children were killed in this transgression. By Allah, their blood will not be forgotten”[19]

Would have a strong emotional effect particularly for Sunni Muslims, which would channel their anger toward the “crusader” nations. In turn, this could lead to further recruitment or possibly inspire international readers to carry out home-grown attacks[20].  

Islamic State also published videos of its “citizens” who had being punished for various transgressions of Shari’ah law. They included scenes of a woman accused of adultery being stoned and alleged gay men thrown off a roof. These images were used as a means of legitimising the “Caliphate” as a state by presenting the efficiency of its Shari’ah  based “justice system” [21]

These examples show that there were a number of motivations for the use of propaganda and information warfare by Islamists during the War On. Firstly, they wanted to legitimise their attacks on infidels thus gaining securing the consent of their populations or at least their passivity[22]. They were also making efforts to maintain their social order by what Huang would call using propaganda as signalling and intimidation[23]. Finally we could look at the IS propaganda as an attempt to transmit their ideology to the world and particularly the west. Their use of brutal videos ensured the campaign wide coverage however, the images seem aimed toward convincing Muslims to follow IS because of its ability to function as a state and eliminate the “enemies of Allah” in short a recruiting tool[24] for those already inclined to join. There is some evidence to show that the way the videos were used by the mainstream media contributed to anti-Muslim prejudice in coalition countries. This prejudice was highlighted and exploited in by IS in subsequent publications[25].

The propaganda campaign of the United States was primarily focused on obtaining public support for war. President Bush told the world we were facing a “new kind of evil” and that the war was “going to take a while”. Given the largely favourable media environment, they were quickly able to form a coalition and Afghanistan was invaded in a matter of months. However in the years following the Taliban were able to re-organise and by 2006 the coalition was fighting a full-blown insurgency. In a display of media savvy the Taliban were able to force the coalition to reduce their use of air power by exaggerating or inventing reports of collateral damage and civilian casualties caused by airstrikes. Due to the negative media reports generated by this campaign, the ISAF was put under pressure to curtail its use of airpower[26].

Munzo tells us that the US has carried out many PSYOPS campaigns in Afghanistan, primarily hearts and minds activates and usually with underwhelming results. Problems usually resulted from a lack of cultural understanding on both sides as well as a chaotic and unwieldy leadership structure. Themes of operations included justifying the invasion to the Afghan people, framing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as enemies of the Afghans and promoting the benefits of democracy to all Afghans.[27]

In the lead up to the second Iraq war the United States and its allies, with the help of friendly media outlets, bombarded the world with the message that the removal of Saddam Hussein was imperative as he was stockpiling WMDs and was an imminent threat to the free world. Coalition forces invaded in March of 2003. Subsequently the case for invading was shown to have been built on stove piped intelligence cherry picked by policy makers to present a narrative for war[28]. Once the WMD narrative was debunked the United Stated quickly pivoted it justification toward bringing  peace to the Middle East, Donald Rumsfeld Stated:

“For if Iraq… is able to move to the path of representative democracy, however bumpy the road, then the impact in the region and the world could be dramatic. Iraq could conceivably become a model – proof that a moderate Muslim state can succeed in the battle against extremism taking place in the Muslim world today”.[29]

These examples show that for the United Sates the primary motivations for the use of propaganda were to legitimise their intentions to go to war and to attempt to win the hearts and minds of the populations once the invasions had taken place.

In this paper, I have provided brief definitions of political conflict and propaganda. We explored some of the historical uses of propaganda as used in political conflict and then used the War on Terror as a case study to find motivations for the use of propaganda. The conclusion is that the primary motivations are to legitimise the actions of the user, usually in the eyes of their own populations. Other motivations are the winning of hearts and minds of occupied populations or the signalling of a state’s power to preserve order.

[1] Wolfsfeld, G. “Political Actors.” INFOCORE. 2015. https://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Def_Political_Actors.pdf (accessed 05 10, 2021).

[2] Mitchell, I M, and M Nicholson. ‘Rationality And The Analysis Of International Conflict.’, The Journal of the Operational Research Society, vol. 44, no. 11, 1993, p. 11-61.

[3] Jenog, Ho-Won, Peace And Conflict Studies: An Introduction. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000.

[4] Smith, Paul A, ‘The Nature of Political War’,’ In On Political War, Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1989, p. 2-28

[5] Baird, J W, “The Myth of Stalingrad.” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 4, no. 3 1969: 187-204.

[6]Ingram, H J, ‘A Brief History Of Propaganda During Conflict: A Lesson For Counter Terrorism Strategic Communications.’,  ICCT Research Paper. The Hauge: Internetional Center For Counter-Terrorism, 2016.

[7] Merari, Ariel, ‘Terrorism As A Strategy Of Insurgency.’ In The History Of terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qeada, edited by A Blin, Berkeley: University of California, 2007, p. 12-53

[8] Jowett, Garth, and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion. 3rd. edn, London, Sage Publications, 1999.

[9] Porche, I R. III et al., Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries For An Army In A Wireless World. Sant Monica, RAND Corporation, 2013.

[10] Taylor, P. M., Debate: Strategic Communications Or Democratic Propaganda?. Journalism Studies, vol. 3 no. 3, 2002, p. 437-452.

[11] Sandhoff, Michelle. Service in a Time of Suspicion: Experiences of Muslims Serving in the U.S. Military Post-9/11. Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 2017.

[12] History.com, ‘A Timeline Of The U.S.-Led War On Terror.’ History.com https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/war-on-terror-timeline (accessed May 10, 2021)

[13] Smith, Paul A, ‘The Nature of Political War’

[14] Ingram, H J. “A Brief History Of Propaganda During Conflict

[15] Barrett, F, and T Sarbin, ‘The Rhetoric Of Terror: ‘War’ As A Misplaced Mataphor.’ In Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide To Theory A Practice, edited by J Arquilla, & D Borer, New York, Routledge, 2007, p. 16-33.

[16] Martin, G, Essentials Of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2008.

[17] Stoddel, Scott, ‘Terror TV’, The American Prospect, vol.12, no. 18, 2011, p. 35-38.

[18] Lakomy, Miron, ‘Danse macabre : Gore Images In The Islamic State’s “Dabiq” Magazine As A Propaganda Device’, The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, vol. 21, no. 2, 2019, p. 143-161.

[19] Dabiq, Issue 1, 2014.

[20] Lakomy, Miron. ‘Danse Macabre’.

[21] Lakomy, Miron. ‘Danse Macabre’.

[22] Jowett, Garth, and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion.

[23] Huang, Haifeng, “Propaganda as Signaling.” Comparative Politics, vol. 47, no. 4, 2015, p. 419-437.

[24] Lakomy, Miron. ‘Danse Macabre’

[25] Hatton, Arthur T, and Michael E Nielsen, “‘War on Terror’ In Our Backyard: Effects Of Framing and Violent ISIS Propaganda On anti-Muslim Prejudice.”, Behavioral Sciences Of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 8, no. 3, 2016, p. 163-176.

[26] Ingram, H J, ‘A Brief History Of Propaganda During Conflict’

[27] Munoz, Arturo, “Main Themes and Messages and Their Effectiveness.”, In U.S. Military Information Operations In Afghanistan: Effectiveness Of Psychological Operations 2001-2010, RAND Corporation, 2012, p. 31-94.

[28] Ingram, H J, ‘A Brief History Of Propaganda During Conflict’

[29] Rumsfeld, D. Remarks By The Secretary Of Defence Donald H Rumsfeld. Council On Foreign Relations, 27 May 2003, 2003.

References

Baird, J W, “The Myth of Stalingrad.” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 4, no. 3 1969: 187-204

Barrett, F, and T Sarbin, ‘The Rhetoric Of Terror: ‘War’ As A Misplaced Mataphor.’ In Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide To Theory A Practice, edited by J Arquilla, & D Borer, New York, Routledge, 2007, p. 16-33.

Dabiq, Issue 1, 2014.

Hatton, Arthur T, and Michael E Nielsen, “‘War on Terror’ In Our Backyard: Effects Of Framing and Violent ISIS Propaganda On anti-Muslim Prejudice.”, Behavioral Sciences Of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 8, no. 3, 2016, p. 163-176.

History.com, ‘A Timeline Of The U.S.-Led War On Terror.’ History.com https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/war-on-terror-timeline (accessed May 10, 2021)

Huang, Haifeng, “Propaganda as Signaling.” Comparative Politics, vol. 47, no. 4, 2015, p. 419-437.

Jenog, Ho-Won, Peace And Conflict Studies: An Introduction. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000.

Jowett, Garth, and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion. 3rd. edn, London, Sage Publications, 1999.

Lakomy, Miron, ‘Danse macabre : Gore Images In The Islamic State’s “Dabiq” Magazine As A Propaganda Device’, The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, vol. 21, no. 2, 2019, p. 143-161.

Martin, G. Essentials Of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2008.

Merari, Ariel, ‘Terrorism As A Strategy Of Insurgency.’ In The History Of terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qeada, edited by A Blin, Berkeley: University of California, 2007, p. 12-53

Mitchell, I M, and M Nicholson. ‘Rationality And The Analysis Of International Conflict.’, The Journal of the Operational Research Society, vol. 44, no. 11, 1993, p. 11-61.

Munoz, Arturo, “Main Themes and Messages and Their Effectiveness.”, In U.S. Military Information Operations In Afghanistan: Effectiveness Of Psychological Operations 2001-2010, RAND Corporation, 2012, p. 31-94.

Porche, I R. III et al., Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries For An Army In A Wireless World. Sant Monica, RAND Corporation, 2013.

Rumsfeld, D. Remarks By The Secretary Of Defence Donald H Rumsfeld. Council On Foreign Relations, 27 May 2003, 2003.

Sandhoff, Michelle. Service in a Time of Suspicion: Experiences of Muslims Serving in the U.S. Military Post-9/11. Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 2017.

Smith, Paul A, ‘The Nature of Political War’,’ In On Political War, Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1989, p. 2-28

Stoddel, Scott, ‘Terror TV’, The American Prospect, vol.12, no. 18, 2011, p. 35-38.

Taylor, P. M., Debate: Strategic Communications Or Democratic Propaganda?. Journalism Studies, vol. 3 no. 3, 2002, p. 437-452.

Wolfsfeld, G. “Political Actors.” INFOCORE. 2015. https://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Def_Political_Actors.pdf (accessed 05 10, 2021).

The post PICT3013 – Research Report – Strategies of Political Violence and Counter Terrorism appeared first on That Freaky NewGuy.

Published in 2017, Associate Professor at American University Thomas Zeitzoff examines the weaknesses in methods of studying the dynamic subject of the internet, social media and their role in modern conflict and contentious politics. Zeitzoff identifies four interconnected points that form a framework for understanding the relationships between advances in communications technology and conflict[1]. He contends that the advances in communications technology and military technology are, more often than not, intertwined[2]. He concludes that the influence social media has on a conflict should not be expressed in terms of providing an advantage to any particular actor but instead needs to be examined in terms of the full strategic implications of the technology as used by all players[3].

In order to facilitate this more comprehensive analysis Zeitzoff introduces a four-pillar blueprint for studying communication technology advances and conflict paraphrased below[4];

Lowered Barriers of Communication: Social media can amplify insurgent messages for little cost.

Increased Speed of Communication: An instantaneous global reach and fast new cycle enable actors to shape their own narrative.

Strategic Dynamic and Adaption: Research should focus on how actors strategically used and adapted social media.

New Data and Information: Social media constantly creates new types of data and information providing new opportunities for researchers.

In introducing the four-pillar framework Zeitzoff builds on conclusions he drew in his previous study of the Iranian-Israeli confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program (2012-13)[5]. This article found that while social media data can be used to study questions of foreign policy there are significant limitations concerning context of messages, selection bias and analysis of network structure[6] and warns that researchers must be aware of the difficulties that make drawing direct conclusions from social media data difficult to support.

 In support for Zeitzoff’s thesis Anita Gohdes examines aspects of the framework while reviewing studies that investigate how the development and permeation of modern communication technology affects conflicts[7]. Gohde’s article divides relevant research into three categories. The first category investigates the effect advances in communications technology has on the probability of political violence by reducing costs for collective organization. The second category looks at conflict dynamics and how they are changed by access to communications technology. The last category investigates how the internet is weaponised during armed conflict.[8]

Gohde’s conclusion echoes Zeitzoff’s contention that data from social media is highly circumstance dependant and needs to be analysed in context[9].

Zeitzoff has provided a good analysis and critique of research methods in the field of social media and conflict. The framework he recommends enables researchers to look beyond the simplistic examination of which actor was advantaged by social media use and truly study the subject in the depth it deserves.

[1] T, Zeitzoff, ‘How Social Media is Changing Conflict’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 61, no. 9, 2017, pp. 1970

[2] ibid, p. 1973

[3] ibid, p. 1984

[4] ibid, p. 1970

[5] T, Zeitzoff, ‘Using Social Media To Measure Foreign Policy Dynamics: An Empirical Analysis Of The Iranian-Israeli Confrontation’, (2012-13)’, Journal Of Peace Research, vol. 52, no. 3, 2015, pp. 368-383

[6] ibid, pp 380

[7] A.R, Gohdes, ‘Studying The Internet And Violent Conflict’, Conflict Management And Peace Science, vol. 35, no. 1, 2018, pp. 89-106

[8] ibid, pp. 90

[9] ibid, p. 99

Bibliography

Gohdes, A.R., ‘Studying The Internet And Violent Conflict’, Conflict Management And Peace Science, vol. 35, no. 1, 2018, pp. 89-106

Zeitzoff, T., ‘How Social Media is Changing Conflict’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 61, no. 9, 2017, pp. 1970-191

Zeitzoff, T., ‘Using Social Media To Measure Foreign Policy Dynamics: An Empirical Analysis Of The Iranian-Israeli Confrontation’, (2012-13)’, Journal Of Peace Research, vol. 52, no. 3, 2015, pp. 368-383

The post PICT3013 – Literature Review – Strategies of Political Violence and Counter Terrorism appeared first on That Freaky NewGuy.

The challenging and contentious topic of censorship raises the question of how to reconcile restricting individuals’ freedoms while still ensuring their safety. Censorship’s function can change based on the government and its objectives. While some contend that governments employ censorship as a tool to safeguard their citizens, others see it as a way to curtail their freedom. It is critical to consider a variety of viewpoints and supporting data when assessing the function of censorship.

For this paper we will first have to define what we mean by censorship and look briefly into its history and use. We will offer some case studies that cover some of the roles in question, protection vs restriction as well as censorship evasion. We conclude that censorship has been used by governments since governments existed more recently though, the advent of the internet has spawned various programs of digital censorship. Censorship is used by repressive regimes as well as well as the democratic and in fact it is the censorship programs of some democracies that seem the most insidious. While oppressive regimes will censure access to news or dissident information, they often see this as a method to maintain stability within the country. Democratic governments regularly frame their censorship programs as crime fighting efforts, most often against Child Abuse Material (CAM) or terrorism. This framing instantly puts anyone objecting to the programs on the side of “pedophiles and terrorists.” Unfortunately, once implemented these programs are subject to scope and function creep which potential results of mass surveillance and criminalisation of innocent people. Tools such as TOR can be used to evade censorship and in some cases the discovery of these tools will lead to censorship programs backfiring on the government implementing them.

The English term ‘Censorship’ goes back to the office of the Censor established in Rome in 443 BC (Anastaplo, 2023).  However, censorship was not invented by the Romans or Greeks. Social and political constraints on speech, writing, and theater were prevalent in many ancient civilizations. From the limitations woven into Chinese ideography to the taboos and traditions maintained regarding symbolic meaning in many other societies, from ancient Sumeria and Egypt (Moore, 2016). For this paper we will use the definition provided by the Oxford Dictionary of Media and Communication —“any regime or context in which the content of what is publicly expressed, exhibited, published, broadcast, or otherwise distributed is regulated or in which the circulation of information is controlled,” or “a regulatory system for vetting, editing, and prohibiting particular forms of public expression,” or, even more generally, “the practice and process of suppression or any particular instance of this.” (Oxford Reference, 2023).

The modern version of this definition emphasizes the institutional use of control, makes a distinction between legally administered regimes and contexts and private instances emphasizing the importance of the complex subject of public expression (Moore, 2016). This emphasis sets it apart from previous definitions, such as those found in other Oxford dictionaries, which demonstrate how the word’s Latin roots shaped the concept of the “censor” as a lone operator. “An official whose duty it is to inspect books, journals, plays, etc., before publication, to ensure that they contain nothing immoral, heretical, or offensive or injurious to the State” was the OED’s definition of “censor” in 1974. This usage dates back to 1644. In addition, a 1914 reference to “one who censors private correspondence (as in time of war)” is included (Oxford English Dictionary, 2023).

Censorship is not limited to state actors. It is not unreasonable to argue that publishers may also have an influence on the kinds of cultural expression that are created and made available, just as businesses and organizations have the power to control the news that is reported to the public. This is how media oligopolies enact private censorship. A notable example of a modern public-private partnership is Google.cn, the China-specific version of Google’s widely used search engine. Under official guidance but “charged to draw the line for itself,” a multinational corporation voluntarily assists in the implementation of the Chinese government’s internet censorship system (Moore, 2016).

In the internet age digital censorship – the control, regulation, and restriction of information and communication on digital platforms, including the internet, social media, and other technologies has become a major topic of concern. Digital censorship involves various measures implemented by governments, organizations, or individuals to limit or manipulate the flow of information and control access to certain content. It can also involve online surveillance as the two serve intertwined roles in the cyber landscape (Earl et al., 2022). With the help of dual-use technologies like deep packet inspection, operators can monitor content and internet traffic like email and browser usage. Similar methods can also be used to monitor social media. Traditional surveillance typically targets specific individuals or smaller groups, but digital tools enable surveillance to occur at the internet backbone or internet service provider (ISP) level, so it can happen on a large scale. When it is done at this level, regimes gain extraordinary access to social movements, information on public discontent, and even the actions of state employees whose corruption or incompetence may be fueling unrest (Xu, 2021).

One viewpoint on censorship holds that governments employ it as a tool to safeguard their populace. This point of view contends that censorship is required to uphold social order, safeguard national security, and stop the spread of objectionable or dangerous content. Censorship is seen as a way to protect society’s welfare because some ideas or information can be harmful. For instance, (Ford and Wajcman, 22017) talk about how Wikipedia’s infrastructure can support prejudice and false information. They contend that censorship is a useful tool for addressing these problems and making sure the public has access to inclusive and accurate information. Ironically, the Chinese government frames their use of censorship as a means of maintaining stability by stopping collective action from being organized that might endanger the government (King et al., 2013).  China invests a lot of money in blocking websites from other countries in an effort to stop the spread of uncensored material that might be interpreted as regime-threatening. This implies that the purpose of censorship is to manage the dissemination of information and shield citizens from potentially dangerous or destabilising content (Chen and Yang, 2019).

While many tend to concentrate on the use of surveillance in autocratic settings, Western democracies, such as the United States and Britain also deploy significant surveillance capabilities. Like autocrats, they employ surveillance for preventive measures including quelling or restricting protest. Snowden’s information leaks indicate that this also includes monitoring of domestic and international telecom networks (Gellman and Soltani, 2013). When it comes to online censorship in democracies, the United Kingdom (UK) has led the way since the advent of the modern internet. Since the 1990s, the UK has created various regulations that have been influential globally but raise real questions about legitimacy, accountability, and transparency. These patterns include targeting intermediaries, using the national platform to encourage “voluntary” self-regulation, and promoting automated censorship tools such as web blocking (McIntyre, 2018). These measures, when made public, are usually framed as efforts to protect the populace from such things as Child Abuse Material (CAM), terrorism recruitment / organization and extreme pornography.

The blocking of dubious websites comes with a lot of issues. Almost invariably, choices regarding which URLs to include in the list are made without consulting the website owner (IWF, 2015b). ISPs are free to choose to disregard the recommendation and many have resorted to using fake error messages in place of block pages, which are meant to notify users that a page has been blocked (McIntyre, 2018). This is because the URL List is not available to the public and notice to the site is not necessary at the time of blocking. Similarly, some ISPs have turned to the less complex and less expensive methods of IP address blocking, or DNS poisoning even though the advice is for them to block just the particular URL on the list.

The introduction of URL blacklists opens the door to automatic surveillance. Under such a system attempts to access blocked URLs are automatically reported to police (Heal, 2017). In this instance, a system designed to shield users from unintentional access to CAM has been repurposed to potentially criminalize those users. This use of a URL blacklist highlights concerns regarding function creep and the convergence of censorship and surveillance.

Another system described as a ‘game changer’ in the fight against CAM is the Image Hash List. Microsoft PhotoDNA signatures and MD5 hashes are used to create ‘digital fingerprints’ of CAM which can be used by hosting provides to identify, delete or block uploads of CAM images (McIntyre, 2018). Hash matching presents fresh possibilities for wide ranging censorship. Hash matching systems have the potential to fundamentally alter the dynamics of regulation by allowing for the automated identification and removal of already available CAM and limiting the spread of new content by preventing images from being uploaded. With the help of this tool, an image only needs to be classified once, relieving analysts of a repetitive task and freeing up more time for identification of new images and proactive searching. (IWF, 2015a).

Hash lists are already used by major providers, Google scans all messages sent via Gmail (McCormick, 2014), Microsoft uses PhotoDNA to scan every file uploaded to OneDrive (Microsoft, 2023) and several people have been arrested after using these services (Gibbs, 2014). In addition to being disproportionate in and of itself, this kind of indiscriminate surveillance is also easily co-opted for other kinds of content resulting in function creep. Surveillance of private communication and file scanning could become more commonplace in the context of CAM and be used as a springboard for surveillance for other reasons (McIntyre, 2018).

Despite the fact that trying to circumvent censorship can be challenging, individuals and groups can do so by employing a range of techniques and tools. Potential strategies include using I2P, Freenet, and Tor. These services can be used for sending and receiving sensitive or secret information for both good and bad since they offer decentralized, encrypted, and anonymous internet communications.

For brevity, this paper will focus on the TOR network. The most well-known Dark Net product is undoubtedly Tor (The Onion Router). The free software includes a web browser that resembles Mozilla Firefox, that can be used to access the dark net, offering even inexperienced users a high degree of anonymity. TOR addresses are made up of random keys that end in “.onion”, the browser enables users to access these sites. For example, the address “http://zqktlwiuavvvqqt4ybvgvi7tyo4hjl5xgfuvpdf6otjiycgwqbym2qad.onion/” leads to “The Hidden Wiki,” an index of .onion sites. This page will not open a standard browser like MS Exchange or Chrome; but it will be rendered just as any other webpage in a browser that has Tor enabled. Using a browser that supports Tor has the added benefit of anonymizing your internet activity as you browse. This is achieved by transferring your communication through multiple “nodes” that encrypt your data and conceal your IP address.

Tor was first developed in 2002 by the US Naval Research Laboratory.  A nonprofit organization that provides the user-friendly browser packages, The Tor Project Inc. has now assumed control of development (Mansfield-Devine, 2014). There are ongoing rumors and some supporting data suggesting that the Tor network is still connected to US intelligence services (Levine, 2018). That said, leaked NSA (National Security Agency) documents suggest breaking into the Tor network is incredibly challenging (Landau, 2014). The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs has also released a government tender worth millions of rubles for anyone who can develop a dependable method of breaking Tor’s anonymity (Mansfield-Devine, 2014).

Tor was first created as a secure channel of communication for American intelligence services to use with their operatives abroad. In order to promote unrestricted internet access in circumstances where online censorship was severe or the fear of persecution for those attempting to access information deemed illegal was prohibitive, it was then made available as a free service in 2015 (Moore and Rid, 2016). The National Science Foundation and other US government organizations still provide the lion’s share of funding to the Tor Project. According to (McKim, 2012), these organizations justify this support because Tor ”provides potential life-saving online security and privacy in places – such as Iran and Syria – where political dissidents are often dealt with harshly”.

The use of Tor is often associated with criminality as its hidden services include online drug markets and hacker forums (that is just for starters) however this perception is misleading as (Biryukov et al., 2014) state many hidden services support freedom of speech, human rights, and access to information that is restricted in nations with authoritarian regimes. They discovered that the total number of covert services pertaining to illicit activities was almost equal to that of covert services pertaining to other topics, such as message boards where drug users can obtain guidance on responsible usage and victims of domestic abuse can gather to receive support (Bancroft and Scott Reid, 2017). These figures indicate the percentage of services devoted to the most upsetting topics, like pedophilia and murder, would be extremely small (Greenburg, 2015).

On September 29, 2014, after three days of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, the Chinese government blocked Instagram’s access from within Mainland China. The demonstrations were against the Chinese government’s proposed electoral reforms. Images of the protests were making the rounds on Instagram, leading many to theorize that the platform’s block was designed to prevent any potential disruption from spreading from Hong Kong to Mainland China. Instagram usage significantly decreased as a result of the block. The Great Firewall prevented about half of the Instagram users in China from accessing the platform. The other half, however, discovered ways to get around the restrictions, mainly by using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) (Hobbs and Roberts, 2018).  As new users began using VPNs, they were to access additional political content on Twitter and Wikipedia. For instance, following the Instagram block, views of Chinese-language Wikipedia pages about contentious subjects like Tiananmen Square and Chinese Communist Party leaders increased significantly. A day after starting to use Twitter following Instagram’s block, newcomers in China, started talking about the protests in Hong Kong (Hobbs and Roberts, 2018). This example demonstrates the unintended consequence of providing many “normal” citizens with abrupt incentives to get around censorship and thus gain access to websites and information that many of them had never seen before or had not previously been interested in (Hobbs and Roberts, 2018).

In this paper we have provided a definition of censorship, briefly examining its history and use. Using case studies from China the US and UK we researched the roles in question, protection vs restriction and censorship evasion. We showed that censorship has been used by governments throughout history and that internet has resulted in programs of digital censorship.  we highlighted the use of censorship by repressive regimes as well as the democratic and the fact it is the censorship programs of some democracies that seem the most insidious. Finaly, we demonstrated that tools such as TOR can be used to evade censorship and in some cases the discovery of these tools will lead to censorship programs backfiring on the government implementing them.

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The post PICT3011 – Cyber Security in Practice Research Essay appeared first on That Freaky NewGuy.

ISIS Recruits: Religious Warriors or Useful Fools?

The question about the degree to which religion influences acts of terrorist violence is often raised concerning the concept of “religious terrorism,” This essay will investigate the complex relationship between religion and terrorism through an analysis of ISIS recruitment methods, illuminating the various motivations and influences of these violent acts. Are ISIS recruits religious warriors or a modern version of the useful fools of the Cold War era?

We conclude that religion is often used as a motivator for front-line terrorists; however, their recruitment is based on manipulation and misinformation, while their leaders have more down-to-earth political goals. As a result, the front-line and suicide terrorists do seem comparable to the “useful idiots” who were recruited by the KGB during the Cold War and considered to be expendable once their utility ended; however, there is a significant difference in that while the useful fools were mostly unaware of the results of their actions ISIS recruits, though manipulated do eventually make a concise decision to carry out acts of terrorism.

To carry out this analysis, we must first define religious terrorism and differentiate it from other forms of terrorist violence. We will then briefly examine the phenomena of the “useful fool” as ascribed to the KGB during the Cold War. Next, we examine the recruitment methods used by ISIS, focusing on how it recruits English-speaking Muslims and fighters from the West.

ISIS was chosen for this analysis as it has been shown to still have an active recruitment and propaganda arm that provides a case study from 2022 and 2023. We will determine the role of religion as a motivating factor in terrorism and the influence of political aims on religiously motivated terrorism.

In Western scholarship, the idea of “religious violence” and its implication that religion and violence are inextricably linked has a long history (Cavanaugh, 2004). However, David Rapoport’s influential article analysing the use of terror in the three monotheistic religions is where a more precise term, “religious terrorism,” originated (Gunning & Jackson, 2011). From this foundation, scholars such as Juergensmeyer, Sageman, and Hoffman have elaborated on the concept of  ”religious terrorism,” assigning traits and substantive assertions that delineate it as a particular “type” of political violence that is fundamentally distinct from earlier or other forms of terrorism. Religious terrorism “represents a very different and possibly far more lethal threat than that posed by more familiar, traditional terrorist adversaries,” according to (Hoffman, 2017) it results from radically different value systems, validation mechanisms, moral concepts, and worldviews. He says that the most important distinguishing feature of contemporary terrorism is the religious imperative. One significant repercussion of this apparent turning point in terrorism is that it renders analysis of terrorism based on established groups obsolete (Gunning & Jackson, 2011)

“Traditional” terrorism is characterized by easily recognizable organizations like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Irish Republican Army (IRA). These organizations support one class or ethnic group over another or have specific grievances. These groups attack specific targets with conventional weapons and explosives to humiliate or harm the state or group they are waging war against. They (typically) specifically avoid needless bloodshed, at times alerting authorities to bombings in public places (Tendler, 1996). This is done in order to maintain a position in succeeding governments and be considered an eligible participant in negotiations in the future (Simon & Benjamin, 2001).

Martin describes the New Terrorism as based on cell-based networks that can act independently. They are prepared to use high-intensity weapons and asymmetrical tactics that maximize causalities and have hazy, frequently apocalyptic religious motivations (Martin, 2008). The use of cells creates an amorphous grouping of organizations under an umbrella franchise, such as Islamic State or al Qaeda. This reduces reliance on state sponsorship, allowing the groups to be much less restrained in their attacks than traditional terrorist organizations (Morgan, 2004). The final distinction between traditional and modern terrorists, according to (Martin, 2008), is how well they manipulate the media and use the Internet.

By providing a moral justification, per the terrorist worldview, for actions that would otherwise revolt most people, modern terrorist groups have increased their threat by using religious identity. This is a result of the demographic that the terrorists are targeting. Religious terrorists see themselves as outsiders seeking to replace the entire world order. In contrast, traditional terrorists aim to bring about a change in a system that is seen as generally good but in need of correction. Due to the religious terrorist’s need to purge everyone except fellow believers, more lethal weapons can be used in attacks because winning over supporters is not the primary objective (Hoffman, 2017). This focus on religion as a foundation of new terrorism has led some countries, Australia included, to include a ‘religious cause’ component to their anti-terror legislation whereby in order to bring charges for a terrorist act, the act must have a religious, ideological, or political cause (Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s100.1) (Jabri Markwell, 2023).

Useful fool” or sometimes “useful idiot” is a term used to describe someone cynically being used by the leaders of a cause. The term, which is falsely attributed to Vladimir Lenin, was frequently used during the Cold War to refer to non-communists, sympathetic to communism, who were regarded by Russian intelligence as naive and, therefore, could be manipulated to unknowingly support the strategies of the KGB (Treguer, 2021). These individuals were often recruited because they were naive, gullible, or had strong ideological beliefs aligned with the Soviet Union’s interests.

The KGB used a variety of methods to recruit and manipulate useful fools. One common method was to target individuals who were already involved in left-wing political organizations or movements. These individuals were often attracted to the Soviet Union’s promises of social justice and equality. The KGB would also target individuals who had access to sensitive information, such as journalists, government officials, and academics (Treguer, 2021). Their “usefulness” lay in spreading or legitimizing communist ideologies, often in democratic or capitalist settings, without being directly connected to or controlled by communist parties. Thus, the supposed “Russian attitude” towards these “useful idiots” was one of utilitarian value: they were useful and disposable tools to further the Soviet cause abroad (Naylor, 2021).

The self-declared Pan-Islamic Caliphate Islamic State or ISIS is a Sunni extremist organization with roots in northern Iraq and Syria. At its height in 2014, the Islamic State ruled over sizable portions of both nations, absorbing the bureaucracy and resources of the governments as well as business and industry. The last Islamic State territory in Iraq and Syria was lost in March 2019 (Australian Government, 2023). As a result, the Islamic State has since reverted to conventional terrorist tactics in the region, including areas within Turkey, with increasing ferocity and tactical sophistication.

 As of 2022 – 2023, through satellite entities that are operationally active within designated “provinces” (Wilayat), Islamic State continues to maintain a strong presence worldwide. These include the Abu Sayyaf Group, IS-East Asia, IS-Sinai, IS-Libya, IS Somalia IS-Khorasan Province, and IS West Africa Province, all of which are designated terrorist organizations under the Criminal Code of Australia (Australian Government, 2023). Despite the fact that the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS in Iraq and Syria has significantly decreased as a result of the group’s territorial losses and the growing difficulty of traveling to the region, ISIS has continued to recruit and in recent years has urged potential recruits to travel directly to other ISIS strongholds or remain in their home countries to carry out attacks as part of its global campaign. (Australian Government, 2023).

In these recruitment efforts, the Islamic State presents itself as the embodiment of true Islam as practiced by the first generations of Muslims (Salafism), and it primarily draws on Wahhabism, a particularly strict form of Salafism. The organization is skilled at fostering and utilizing already-existing sectarian rifts in the Middle East. The Islamic State uses religious and racial prejudice to recruit followers and justify its actions or to win over support and defeat those who actively oppose it (Hassan, 2019).

It should be noted, however, that Islamic religious authorities have rejected ISIS’s attempts to connect Islam to its actions. In 2014 and 2015, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al Sheikh, declared that ISIS and Al Qaeda are “Islam’s number one enemy” highlighting that extremism, militancy, and terrorism have nothing to do with Islam. The actions of ISIS against Christians in Mosul were deemed un-Islamic in 2014 by the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq, deeming them contrary to the Prophet Mohammed’s teachings regarding the relationship with the “People of the Book” (Christians, Jews). Over 120 academics and Islamic scholars also found that ISIS had committed over 20 Islam-related offenses (Wilson Center, 2015).

 At its height in 2014, ISIS seized control of roughly 40% of Iraq and 60% of Syria. Additionally, it drew more than 40,000 foreign fighters from more than 130 nations into its ranks. ISIS terrorized people in the areas it seized and carried out terrorist attacks worldwide, including Sydney, Jakarta, Brussels, New York, Istanbul, London, Nice and Paris. More than 14 affiliates in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia also joined ISIS’s global network (Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020). The recruitment of Westerners and English-speaking Muslims by ISIS has been a significant concern for counterterrorism efforts. The strategies and factors used in this recruitment are outlined below.

Online Propaganda and Social Media: ISIS has successfully spread its message and attracted new members using social media and online propaganda platforms (Johnston, 2022; Awan, 2017; Badawy & Ferrara, 2018). These platforms enable ISIS  to connect with a global audience, target particular demographics, and customize their messages using various languages, including English, Arabic, Russian, and others (Ibrahim & Shi, 2019). Welch found that ISIS propaganda materials’ use of videos, images, and narratives was particularly effective at luring recruits (Welch, 2018). Online platforms’ capacity to foster a sense of community and belonging has also been a key component of recruitment efforts (Badawy & Ferrara, 2018).

Narratives and Ideology: ISIS propaganda often employs powerful narratives that appeal to individuals’ psychological predispositions and desires for heroism, justice, and belonging (Yoder et al., 2020; Welch, 2018). The narratives highlight the establishment of a caliphate, the defence of Islam, and the promise of a utopian society (Rane & Courty, 2020). By framing their actions as part of a larger ideological struggle, ISIS targets individuals who may feel marginalized, disenchanted, or alienated from their societies. The manipulation of religious symbols and the conflation of Islam and Islamist ideology in propaganda materials further contribute to the appeal of ISIS among Western Muslims (Rane & Courty, 2020). ISIS employs sophisticated strategies to manipulate information and shape public opinion. This includes the dissemination of false narratives, framing techniques, and the use of violent and shocking imagery to instil fear and attract attention (Mahood & Rane, 2016; Ibrahim & Shi, 2019). By exploiting grievances and perceived injustices, ISIS seeks to present itself as a viable alternative and a force for change (Shorer, 2018).

Targeting Vulnerable Individuals: ISIS has shown a particular interest in targeting vulnerable individuals, including young adults and women (Cottee & Cunliffe, 2018; Shorer, 2018). Video games, social networks, and chat rooms allow ISIS to establish relationships and engage in stage-by-stage relational development with potential recruits, sometimes called grooming. The promise of adventure, purpose, and a sense of belonging can appeal to individuals who may feel marginalized or disconnected from their communities (Abumelhim et al., 2022). The recruitment of women by ISIS has also been facilitated through the manipulation of gender roles and the promise of empowerment (Shorer, 2018). Perhaps most egregious, their recruitment strategies online have included deliberately targeting people with specific mental health disorders (such as autism spectrum disorder) with the aim of stimulating them to commit lone-wolf terrorist attacks (Lennings et al., 2010).

As noted above, the results of these methods were a specular success in the early days of the Caliphate, and even though ISIS is significantly weakened, they are still being used today. ISIS differs from other militant Islamist groups in that it was born during the internet era, when people, especially young adults, feel like the world is smaller and more connected than ever.

ISIS uses a variety of methods to lure recruits, including face-to-face recruiting on the ground, cold calling online, and using friends and family networks. The latter involves recruiters using swarming and love-bombing tactics to get in touch with people who support ISIS propaganda by liking, retweeting, sharing, or otherwise responding to ISIS social media recruitment. The recruiters lavishly court them and going out of their way to make them feel special in an effort to persuade them to join the group.  Others draw recruits by involving them in political and religious discussions meant to start them down the ISIS pathway (Lennings et al., 2010). Some recruits made friends over the Internet with those who had joined and travelled to the battlefield and were encouraged by these new friends to do the same. The common thread through these recruitment methods was the misrepresentation of Islam and the realities of life in the Caliphate in order to convince their new ”friends” to travel and join ISIS.

When speaking with ISIS members on the Internet or viewing ISIS propaganda, most men and women recruited anticipated a much more positive experience than they had. ISIS portrayed hijrah, the allegedly required Islamic migration to the Caliphate to live under sharia law, as a way to find personal significance, purpose, and belonging while upholding Islamic principles, living in prosperity, and enjoying protection. They neglected to mention the brutal penalties for disobedience, the fact that ISIS could accuse and punish anyone for any reason at any time, the fact that men would be forced to fight for the organization whether they wanted to or not, the fact that women would need to remarry in succession if their husbands were killed, and the fact that once a person joined, they could not leave. Thus, the recruiters presented an idealistic Islamic state, and those who travelled explicitly to join ISIS had gone with the expectation of realizing some utopian dream that, in the end, was radically dissimilar from the idealized state they had been sold (Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020).

Can the argument be made that front-line terrorists or those that “self-radicalise” are comparable to useful fools? Although there are distinct differences between ISIS recruits and the idea of “useful fools,” similarities between the two can be found. Both ‘useful fools’ and ISIS recruits are susceptible to manipulation techniques that skew their worldview and affect their decisions. ISIS recruiters strategically motivate potential members, presenting an image of purpose, belonging, and adherence to Islamic principles, whereas ‘useful fools’ are manipulated by ideologies without necessarily being aware of their role or impact. They propagate perspectives or ideologies inadvertently, being valuable for their influence rather than direct action. However, the core difference lies in the level of involvement and ideological commitment. ISIS recruits consciously choose a path of terrorism based on their manipulated ideological convictions, often expecting a particular outcome, whereas ‘useful fools’ play their part unknowingly, spreading ideologies without complete awareness of the agendas they serve. Therefore, while both are victims of manipulation, the level of consent, awareness, and active participation differentiate ISIS recruits from ‘useful fools.’

In this paper, we have defined religious terrorism and differentiated it from other forms of terrorist violence. We then briefly examined the role of the “useful fool” during the cold war before moving on to analyse the recruitment methods used by ISIS following their loss of territory. The still active recruitment efforts provide a case study from 2022 – 2023.

By comparing and contrasting the motivations of ISIS recruits with the “useful fools” of the Cold War, we conclude that while religion plays a crucial role, functioning as a powerful motivator and recruiting tool for many terrorist cells, it is primarily used as a shield or justification for more terrestrial, political objectives. Recruit experiences reinforce this assertion, revealing that behind many religiously framed calls to action or violence, there lie strategic misinformation and earthly political aims of the leaders. In contrast, recruits are often less interested in the religious aspect than in fulfilling more basic needs. Lastly, modern media manipulation techniques have increasingly blurred the lines between religious conviction and political ambitions. Consequently, our understanding of ‘religious terrorism’ needs to evolve, acknowledging that religion is not the sole instigator but a component of a larger construct involving political, sociological, and psychological elements.

REFERENCES

Abumelhim, M.H., Radaideh, R.M. & Abu-Alkeshek, E.O. (2022) ‘Sociology of Terrorism: A Brief History and Overview of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) Propaganda Wing From a  Socio-Educational Perspective’, Journal of Educational and Social Research,

Australian Government (2023) Islamic State. [Online] [online]. Available from: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-australia-is-doing/terrorist-organisations/listed-terrorist-organisations/islamic-state (Accessed 23 September 2023).

Awan, I. (2017) ‘Cyber-Extremism: Isis and the Power of Social Media’, Society,

Badawy, A. & Ferrara, E. (2018) ‘The Rise of Jihadist Propaganda on Social Networks’, Journal of Computational Social Science,

Cavanaugh, W.T. (2004) THE VIOLENCE OF ‘RELIGION’: EXAMINING A PREVALENT MYTH.

Cottee, S. & Cunliffe, J. (2018) ‘Watching ISIS: How Young Adults Engage With Official English-Language ISIS Videos’, Studies in Conflict &Amp; Terrorism,

Gunning, J. & Jackson, R. (2011) ‘What’s so “religious” about “religious terrorism”?’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4(3), pp. 369–388.

Hassan, H. (2019) ‘The Sectarianism of the Islamic State. Ideological Roots and Political Context’, in Beyond Sunni and Shia: The Roots of Sectarianism in a Changing Middle East. [Online]. New York,YN: Oxford University Press.

Hoffman, B. (2017) Inside Terrorism. New York,YN: Columbia University Press.

Ibrahim, D.A. & Shi, Y. (2019) ‘The ISIS’ Discourse From the Rise to the Collapse: Analysis of ISIS’ Discourse Through Films “Flames of War I &Amp; II”’, Media Watch,

Jabri Markwell, R. (2023) ‘Religion as a Motive – Does Australian Terrorism Law Serve Justice?’, International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy,

Johnston, N. (2022) ‘Selling terror: a multidimensional analysis of the Islamic State’s recruitment propaganda’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 76(2), pp. 194–218.

Lennings, C.J., Amon, K.L., Brummert, H. & Lennings, N.J. (2010) ‘Grooming for terror: The internet and young people’, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 17(3), pp. 424–437.

Mahood, S. & Rane, H. (2016) ‘Islamist Narratives in ISIS Recruitment Propaganda’, The Journal of International Communication,

Martin, Gus. (2008) Essentials of terrorism : concepts and controversies. Los Angeles: SAGE Publications.

Morgan, M.J. (2004) ‘The Origins of the New Terrorism’, Parameters (Carlisle, Pa.), 34(1), pp. 29–43.

Naylor, A. (2021) Russia, Explained: Putin’s ‘Useful Idiots’. [Online] [online]. Available from: https://cepa.org/article/russia-explained-putins-useful-idiots/ (Accessed 26 September 2023).

Rane, H. & Courty, A. (2020) ‘The Caliphate Wants You! Conflating Islam and Islamist Ideology in Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Recruitment Propaganda and Western Media Reporting’, in Propaganda and Public Relations in Military Recruitment. [Online]. Routledge. pp. 192–206.

Shorer, M. (2018) ‘Mobilization of Women to Terrorism: Tools and Methods of ISIS’, International Annals of Criminology,

Simon, S. & Benjamin, D. (2001) ‘The Terror’, Survival, 43(4), pp. 05–18.

Speckhard, A. & Ellenberg, M.D. (2020) ‘ISIS in their own words: Recruitment history, motivations for joining, travel, experiences in ISIS, and disillusionment over time-Analysis of 220 in-depth interviews of ISIS returnees, defectors and prisoners’, Journal of Strategic Security, 13(1), pp. 82–127.

Tendler, S. (1996) ‘IRA May End Bomb Warnings’, The Times, 11 March.

Treguer, P. (2021) ‘USEFUL IDIOT’: MEANING AND ORIGIN. [Online] [online]. Available from: https://wordhistories.net/2021/03/26/useful-idiot/ (Accessed 26 September 2023).

Welch, T. (2018) ‘Theology, Heroism, Justice, and Fear: An Analysis of ISIS Propaganda Magazines<i>Dabiq</I>and<i>Rumiyah</I>’, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict,

Wilson Center (2015) Muslims Against ISIS Part 1: Clerics & Scholars. [Online] [online]. Available from: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/muslims-against-isis-part-1-clerics-scholars (Accessed 27 September 2023).

Yoder, K.J., Ruby, K., Pape, R.A. & Decety, J. (2020) ‘EEG Distinguishes Heroic Narratives in ISIS Online Video Propaganda’, Scientific Reports,

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The Battle of Midway (1942)

Battle of Midway WWII – Specifics

Date: June 4 -7 1942

Place: On and around Midway Atoll 28°12′N 177°21′W

Event: American ambush of Japanese carrier forces

Result: American Victory

Commanders:

Losses:

In June 1942 the Battle of Midway marked an important turning point in World War Two. During the battle aircraft for the American carriers Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise ambushed and destroyed a significant portion of the Japanese Navy’s carrier force. The battle is considered a significant example of how intelligence can be applied to any level of warfare.

The main reason given for the American victory is most often the breaking of the Japanese codes by U.S. navy intelligence. However further study of the battle shows this to be a simplistic view that ignores several further levels of intelligence successes and failures that contributed to the outcome. The fact that the code breakers we able to do their jobs so well is really just the tip of a fairly complicated iceberg that included deception, surveillance, reconnaissance and development of effective intelligence processes. The battle of midway is a story of intelligence being used to achieve surprise. It is further interesting because it is one of the few instances where the intended victims (American forces) were able to avoid and then actually inflict surprise on their attackers (Markam, 1993, p. 5).

In analysing this event we can observe the effects of several intelligence fields on the outcome, these include cryptography / signals intelligence (SIGINT), deception, and dissemination I will go into more detail on each of these below.

 Deception:

Deception was used or attempted by both sides on the Midway battle. Firstly Midway was not actually the objective, the objective was to lure the remaining American carriers into a pitched battle where they could be overwhelmed by the Japanese fleet. The capture of Midway was supposed to be the bait. The Japanese also sent a force to attack the Aleutian Islands as a feint. (Markam, 1993, pp. 16-17)

Nimitz was also using deception, he made sure that the carer Enterprise was seen by the Japanese near the East Solomons before it returned to Pearl Harbor. He also made use of smaller ships broadcasting on aircraft carrier frequencies to make it look like some of the carriers we in the Coral Sea (Markam, 1993, pp. 16-18)  it was due to these efforts that let the Japanese to the conclusion that they had achieved surprise and that any type of attack on their forces was unlikely. (Tully & Lu, 2015, p. 87)

The most famous use of deception at Midway involves tricking the Japanese into confirming Midway as the target. In May not everyone was convinced that Midway was a target. Codebreakers could only indicate that a major operation was in the works against some place the Japanese only referred to as “AF”.  In order to confirm a message was sent via an undersea cable (un-tappable by the Japanese) instructing Midway to report that they were having problems with their desalination plant, and were running short on water, the message was to be sent in the clear which virtually guaranteed that it would be intercepted. A few days later a message was decrypted reporting that “AF” was running low on water confirming midway as “AF” and the target. (McDermott & Bar-Joseph, 2016, p. 960)

Cryptography and SIGINT:

The heart of the Battle of midway story is of course the breaking of the Japanese Navy’s JN-25 code by SIGINT analysts at Station Hypo. By March 1942 they were reporting daily on hundreds of navel intercepts. Due to the fact that some Japanese commander used outdated codebooks the American listeners were able to capture transmissions using both old and new codes allowing for faster cracking of new cyphers. The Japanese did eventually change their codes however by that time the Americans had practically all of Yamamoto’s battle plans, strategy and transit dates and were in a position to lay a trap of their own. (Elder, n.d.)

The Japanese seem to have been somewhat cavalier in their implementations of cyphers. Often leaving them in place longer then they should. They were of the opinion that even if the cypher were broken the complexities of the Japanese language would make translating impossible. This of course is nonsense as the Navy had started hiring fluent Japanese speakers and experts in Japanese culture to assist in their codebreaking. (Tucker, 2015, p. 84)

Dissemination and Acceptance

The importance of dissemination and the acceptance by the consumer of intelligence product cannot be underestimated. Markam tells us that in evaluating intelligence success or failure we need to keep in mind whether it was the “intelligence system” that failed or did the consumer fail to make use of the resulting product (Markam, 1993, p. 10)

After the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 the war in the Pacific had been going badly for America. The turnaround at Midway was achieved by Joe Rochefort dramatically improving the quality of intelligence product and then being able to convince Admiral Chester Nimitz that the intelligence analysis his team was producing was trustworthy.

 Joe Rochefort was put in charge of Station Hypo, the naval cryptography division at Pearl Harbor as part of a post Peral Harbor overhaul of Navy’s Intelligence services. Rochefort was an expert on Japan as well as an experienced cryptanalyst. It was Rochfordts teams work during the battle of the Coral Sea that gave Nimitz the confidence to trust Rochefort over the often conflicting assessments he would often get from the Washington based intelligence services. (Dahl, 2013, p. 83).

The Japanese had issues with their dissemination, given that they were operating under radio silence there were several missed opportunities for them to be warned that they had lost the element of surprise. Tully and Yu show us that the Japanese went into battle with an extremely limited picture of what the Americans were doing and though they made reasonable decisions based on the intelligence they possessed this could not save them from the reality in which they found themselves. (Tully & Lu, 2015, p. 95)

Impact:

The victory at Midway was confirmation that the reforms introduced after Pearl Harbor were effective. Just six months earlier the U.S had suffered a crushing defeat due largely to failures in its intelligence systems. By re-establishing the intelligence units with experts not only in cryptography but also language and culture they were able to vastly improve their intelligence product. This basic model is still in use today. The battle of Midway demonstrated any early example of what is now called “battlespace awareness”  and it was by improving on this that enabled the U.S to claim victory later during the Battle of the Philippine Sea. (Donovan & Mack, 2014).

References

Alcala, R. W., 1995. Effective Operational Deception: Learning the Lessons of Midway and Desert Storm.. Newport: Naval War College.

Anon., n.d. Totally History. [Online]
Available at: http://totallyhistory.com/battle-of-midway/
[Accessed 29 03 2017].

Barde, R. E., 1983. Midway: Tarnished Victory. Military Affairs: The Journal of Military History, Including Theory and Technology, 47(4), pp. 188-192.

Dahl, E. J., 2013. Why Won’t They Listen? Comparing Receptivity Toward Intelligence At Pearl Harbor and Midway. Intelligence and National Security, 28(1), pp. 68-90.

Donovan, P. & Mack, J., 2014. Code Breaking in the Pacific. London: Springer.

Elder, G., n.d. Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive. Studies in Intelligence, 50(2).

Markam, S. A., 1993. Intelligence And Surprise: The Battles Of Midway, Newport: Naval War College.

McDermott, R. & Bar-Joseph, U., 2016. Pearl Harbor And Midway: The Decisive Influence Of Two Men On The Outcomes. Intelligence and National Security, 31(7), pp. 949-962.

Tucker, S. C., 2015. Pearl Harbor: The Essential Reference Guide. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.

Tully, A. & Lu, Y., 2015. A Question Of Estimates: How Faulty intelligence Drove Scouting At The Battle of Midway. Naval War College Review, 68(2), pp. 85-99.

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