Introduction
In 2009 the Australian government published its Defence White Paper stating that for many decades Australia and the Asia Pacific region had been enjoying an era of stability and peace largely as a result of the strategic primacy of the United States. Ominously it goes on to say that the rise of China is shrinking the power gap between the US and China and is a threat to US primacy. It goes on to say that as the US is increasingly tested there is a ‘concerning possibility of growing confrontation” between the powers (Australian Government 2009, p. 49). This thinking gave rise to papers such as John Mearsheimers The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia (Mearsheimer 2010) that warn of impending great power conflict in the region and inspired Graham Allison to write first an essay and then book that coin the phrase Thucydide’s Trap to describe the conflict caused by a rising power disrupting the status quo (Allison 2015), (Allison 2017).
Thucydide’s Trap refers to the ancient Greek historian (and general) best known for his work Histories of the Peloponnesian War. Allison uses the quote “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable.” And it is through this lens that Allison focuses on U.S.-China relations portraying China as the ambitious rising power and the U.S. as the hegemon unwilling to give up its position. His conclusion is that direct conflict between the U.S. and China is all but inevitable without major efforts toward peace by both sides.
This paper examines two debates around the concept of Thucydides’ Trap. Firstly, we look at whether the theory is an accurate depiction of the cause of conflict. Wars start for many reasons does the Trap theory provide a broad enough perspective for reasonable analysis? Secondly we examine if Allison’s analogy between the Athens – Sparta conflict and U.S.-China relations is an historically apt one. Are the power dynamics as similar as made out or could other forces be a play that need to be included in any analysis?
Our conclusion is that while the Thucydides trap metaphor is a generally useful device to focus attention on the U.S.-China situation a general sense. It is not terribly historically accurate and analysts should beware of its simplistic approaches to a complex topic.
Is Thucydidies’ Trap Too Simple?
The popular description of the Trap is quite simple. Basically a metaphor for power transition theory it focuses on a single factor, the overtaking of a hegemon by a rising power, to explain interstate war in this case the Peloponnesian War. However, as Chan points out the historical analogy comparing the U.S. to the authoritarian state of Sparta and China to democratic Athens is somewhat ironic and the claim that war becomes “inevitable” as the rising power catches up to the dominant power is a rainbow connection that ignores some 2500 years of developments such as the modern state system, nuclear weapons and nationalism. He goes on to claim that the nature of American democracy would preclude them from launching a preventative war against China (Chan 2019, pp. 12-13).
Continuing to examine the causes of conflict through the Peloponnesian lens Jaffe tells us that the causes of the war were not solely due to an external structural necessity but include the intricate cultural and psychological responses unique to the belligerents (Jaffe 2017) and Chan goes on to speculate that factors such as armament races, economic characteristics, alliances and leader’s personalities also play a role (Chan 2019, p. 15).
Allison does address some of these issues in Destined for War however the use of the “Rise of Athens” line to define Thucydides’ Trap has in some cases led to an overly simplistic view of IR and can lead to analysts falling into the trap of attributing monocausal explanations to what is usually a complex situation.
Different Power Dynamics
Thucydides describes the Athenian rise to power in the first book of History (Collingwood 1830). After the Persian Wars Athens exploited a maritime alliance to exert control over its allies, demanded tribute and violently suppressed any defection or decent. It embarked in a campaign to coerce other Greek city-states to join its “alliance” the Delian League. These activities began to encroach on Sparta’s sphere of influence provoking the Spartans to declare war. This description of the conflicts origins is at odds with the current U.S.-China relationship. Frideberg argues that while China does seek some form of regional hegemony it does not pursue conquest over its neighbours (Friedberg 2011, p. 157). (Lee 2019, p. 76) tells us that despite concerns regarding the build-up of influence from the One Belt One Road program it would be an exaggeration to claim that China was aiming to reduce other countries to imperial vassals. While the situation could change the evidence so far indicates that the U.S is facing a very different strategic challenge than what Sparta faced so long ago.
Of further concern regarding the power dynamics in play are the differences in how war is perceived by the belligerents. Eckstein tells us that war in ancient Greece was common and considered a legitimate, normal course of action. Society today approaches war with far greater caution with greater regard to its costs in life and wealth. Unbridled aggression is not considered a legitimate method of resolving disputes (Eckstein 2017).
While these differences in power dynamics do not preclude the possibility of war they cast some doubt on the all-encompassing nature of the Thucydides Trap theory and its use of the Peloponnesian War as a metaphor for the current U.S.-China situation.
Conclusion
Allisons use of the Thucydides’ Trap metaphor to draw attention to the potential for Chinas rise to lead to great power conflict provides a valuable lens through which to observe the current U.S.-China relationship. One needs to keep in mind however that while the comparison may be relevant in a general sense, a deeper and more encompassing analysis is required to get a true picture of the situation.
References
Allison, G., 2015. The Thucydides Trap: Are The US And China Headed For War?.. The Atlantic, 24(9).
Allison, G. T., 2017. Destined for war : Can America And China Escape Thucydides’s trap?. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Australian Government, 2009. Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030. [Online]
Available at: http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf
[Accessed 3 July 2021].
Chan, S., 2019. More Than One Trap: Problematic Interpretations And Overlooked Lessons From Thucydides. Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 24, pp. 11-24.
‘BOOK I: CHAPTER IV: From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War – The Progress from Supremacy to Empire’ (1830) in History of the Peloponnesian War. S. Collingwood, pp. 30–38. Available at: https://search-ebscohost-com.simsrad.net.ocs.mq.edu.au/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lfh&AN=34346743&site=ehost-live (Accessed: 1 May 2022).
Eckstein, A. M., 2017. Thucydides, International Law and International Anarchy. In: R. K. Balot, S. Forsdyke & E. Foster, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Thucydides. New York, NY.: Oxford University Press.
Friedberg, A., 2011. A Contest For Supremacy: China, America, And The Struggle For Mastery In Asia. New York: Norton.
Jaffe, S. N., 2017. Thucydides On The outbreak Of War: Character And Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lee, J., 2019. Did Thucydides Believe in Thucydides’ Trap? The History of the Peloponnesian War and Its Relevance to U.S.-China Relations. Journal of Chinese Political Science, Volume 24, pp. 67-86.
Mearsheimer, J. J., 2010. The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 3, pp. 381-396.