Question: Why do political actors use information warfare and propaganda in political conflicts?
Propaganda and information warfare are tools that have been used by actors in political conflicts throughout history. Most recently, there has been great focus on the propaganda created by groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State focusing on their high quality productions, internet presence and use of social media. However the War On Terror features propaganda and information warfare use on both sides of the conflict. In an effort to learn why political actors would use these tools this report explores the history of propaganda and information warfare use in political conflict. Then by studying their employment by both sides of the War on Terror find some of the motivations for their employment in political conflict.
When we talk about political actors, we need to consider that we do not just mean nation states and their associated politicians. Political actors are persons or entities who have obtained some measure of political power or authority in a particular society and are thus able to have a significant influence on policies and outcomes associated with a given conflict. Such entities would include not only politicians but also NGOs, insurgent / terrorist groups such as the Taliban, Islamic State or Al-Qaeda or even criminal gangs such as the Mexican Cartels.[1]
Nicholson describes conflict as the state of disagreement or opposition between two or more people; this can be extrapolated to mean two or more groups that do not have a consensus and are therefore on a collision course in the pursuit of irreconcilable goals[2]. In the case of political conflict Jenog tells us that it is the condition where two or more groups take part in a dispute over claims to power, status or resources with the aim to neutralize or eliminate their opponents thus political conflict is a demonstration of cross-purposes of political groups which often leads to political conflict[3]. Political conflict may be expressed through violence, diplomacy, economic pressure or subversion however as Smith tells us a key attribute is the use of words images and ideas in the form of propaganda and psychological warfare[4].
Propaganda and information warfare are terms that are often misused to refer to any form of persuasive communication issued by a state, bringing up images of Nazi films depicting Jews as vermin and state controlled newspapers trumpeting the German armies “noble sacrifice” after their defeat at Stalingrad, neglecting to mention that ninety thousand had been taken into captivity[5]. This paper will use the term ‘propaganda’ to refer to messaging designed to influence the behavior and attitudes of a target audience to achieve politico-military ends during conflict[6]. While generally believed to involve lies propaganda can be based on fact or ‘truth’ and propaganda based on facts is considered the most effective and persuasive.
Referred to as ‘rhetoric’ by the ancient Greeks, propaganda has been used extensively since well before the 20th century to further various political and religious agendas by highlighting the negative or positive aspects of an idea, person or state. Propaganda can take the form of music, art, speeches or other types of media. It can also incorporate actions or “propaganda by deed” these can be benevolent activates like building schools to win the trust of a population or acts of violence intended to draw attention to a cause, attract recruits and encourage media coverage through shock value[7].
For the purpose of analysis, propaganda can be divided into different classifications the first being between black, white and grey. Black propaganda is covert, possibly from a false source and often consists of lies. White propaganda is overt, mostly accurate and comes from a known source. Grey propaganda falls between the two extremes where there is uncertainty of either the source or accuracy of the information.[8]
The term Information Warfare covers a number of areas of modern conflict such as computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception and information security[9]. The definition from the Institute for the Advanced Study of ‘Information Warfare’ is:
“…the offensive and defensive use of information and information systems to exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary’s information and information systems, while protecting one’s own. Such actions are designed to achieve advantages over military or business adversaries”[10]
For the purposes if this paper, we will focus on the aspects of PSYOPs and military deception as they pertain to the use of propaganda by all sides in the War on Terror.
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four passenger jets and crashed them into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon (the fourth was overrun by passengers and crashed on its way to a target in Washington, DC) Almost 3,000 people were killed in the coordinated attack unprecedented on American soil. In the aftermath, the United States has struggled to find a balance between national security and civil rights while engaging in what became its longest-lasting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The events of 9/11 and the consequent “War on Terror” revived long-standing stereotypes in the United States that portrayed Muslims as fundamentally different from other Americans[11]
Days after the 9-11 attacks, President George W. Bush declared to congress:
“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”
By October 20, 2001, a coalition including Australia, Britain, Turkey, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, France and Poland deployed to Afghanistan and ground operations had commenced against Taliban and Al-Qaeda targets. By December 7, 2001, the last Taliban holdouts at Kandahar had fallen. In February of 2002, terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda kidnapped New York Times journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan later posting a video of his beheading on the internet, the first of many beheading videos to follow. On March 19, 2003, Coalition forces invaded Iraq claiming that they had intelligence proving the country was in possession of and developing weapons of mass destruction. On the 1st May, 2003, President Bush gave his “Mission Accomplished” speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln stating that major combat operations in Iraq had ended. On August 19, 2003, a suicide bomber drove a truck bomb into the UN headquarters in Baghdad killing 23 people and injuring 100. On December 13, 2003, U.S forces captured Saddam Hussein, he was then executed on December 30, 2006[12].
The timeline above outlines the beginning of the conflict that has come to be called the “War on Terror” ongoing even twenty years later and spanning the globe the conflict has seen the continuous occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq while the U.S dominated coalition attempt to install stable governments while battling increasingly sophisticated insurgencies. Below we will examine some of the propaganda techniques used by both sides of the conflict to determine why they were used and how effective they were.
The use of propaganda or information warfare by political actors is usually done to carry out, public diplomacy and / or psychological operations. Public diplomacy is conducted openly by civilians to a wide audience it can be considered international political promotion. It targets civilians and seeks to elicit popular support for policies beneficial to those deploying it usually is support of negotiations via diplomatic channels. Military personnel in pursuit of military objectives conduct psychological operations. PSYOPS usually targes hostile military personnel but could include neutrals or civilians[13]. Below we will examine some examples of public diplomacy and psychological operations as used by both sides of the War on Terror.
Days after the 9-11 attacks President Bush was warning the world that it was facing a “new kind of evil” and likening the war on terrorism to a “crusade” a word deeply symbolic in Muslim history. The war on terror rhetoric of Us vs. Them was used as a model by states around the world to legitimise strategic and policy decisions on a national and global scale. Bin Laden was able to re-frame this rhetoric as a call to arms for by focusing on the “evident Crusader hatred in this campaign against Islam” He pointed out that Bush had “stated clearly that this is a Crusader war[14]” This co-option of Bushes own published words was a valuable tool for recruitment to the Islamist cause. The ‘War on Terror’ paradigm would eventually be discontinued as clumsy and easy to counter rhetorically[15] particularly by modern terrorists.
Bin Ladens ability to turn the “crusade” comment back on the US and successfully use it in later recruitment campaigns indicates that the coalition was dealing with a new kind of terrorist. Martin describes “New Terrorism” as groups that have vague, religious and often apocalyptic motivations. These groups’ use asymmetric methods to inflict maximum casualties with no distinction between military or civilian targets; they are also recognised for their skills in internet use and media manipulation[16]. For example by timing the strikes on the World Trade Centre approximately forty-five minutes apart the planners were able to ensure that news organisations had time to break in to their normal programming and deploy their cameras, guaranteeing that millions of people would witness the second plane strike[17]. There are also reports from journalists kidnapped in Iraq that their abductions were simply “attention seeking” acts carried out for the sole purpose of putting a particular militia group in front of the cameras. The journalists expressed their frustration with their editorial bosses who focused on these “kidnappings” over stories about the plight of ordinary Iraqis living through the conflict thus giving the militias free “publicity”
This embrace of the media and digital technology is best demonstrated in the rise if the Islamic State and their “cyber jihadist” campaign presenting brutal and extreme images including (but by no means limited to) decapitations, crucifixions, burnings, running over people with tanks and even making toddlers carry out executions. This content, produced with an unusually high level to technological skill including high definition video and cutting-edge post-production effects made this propaganda extremely effective. The millions of views and international interest generated by decapitation videos are testament[18].
One of the main aims of this campaign was legitimising the use of violence against infidels, this was done by presenting it as revenge for crimes committed against Islamists for example publishing pictures of women and children killed in an American air strike on a convoy said to have been transporting the families of Islamic State militants. The graphic production of these atrocities against Muslims along with the statement:
“The crusaders justify such actions for themselves – alone – under the pretence of ‘collateral damage’ while denouncing others for ‘terrorism.’ Nine women and five children were killed in this transgression. By Allah, their blood will not be forgotten”[19]
Would have a strong emotional effect particularly for Sunni Muslims, which would channel their anger toward the “crusader” nations. In turn, this could lead to further recruitment or possibly inspire international readers to carry out home-grown attacks[20].
Islamic State also published videos of its “citizens” who had being punished for various transgressions of Shari’ah law. They included scenes of a woman accused of adultery being stoned and alleged gay men thrown off a roof. These images were used as a means of legitimising the “Caliphate” as a state by presenting the efficiency of its Shari’ah based “justice system” [21]
These examples show that there were a number of motivations for the use of propaganda and information warfare by Islamists during the War On. Firstly, they wanted to legitimise their attacks on infidels thus gaining securing the consent of their populations or at least their passivity[22]. They were also making efforts to maintain their social order by what Huang would call using propaganda as signalling and intimidation[23]. Finally we could look at the IS propaganda as an attempt to transmit their ideology to the world and particularly the west. Their use of brutal videos ensured the campaign wide coverage however, the images seem aimed toward convincing Muslims to follow IS because of its ability to function as a state and eliminate the “enemies of Allah” in short a recruiting tool[24] for those already inclined to join. There is some evidence to show that the way the videos were used by the mainstream media contributed to anti-Muslim prejudice in coalition countries. This prejudice was highlighted and exploited in by IS in subsequent publications[25].
The propaganda campaign of the United States was primarily focused on obtaining public support for war. President Bush told the world we were facing a “new kind of evil” and that the war was “going to take a while”. Given the largely favourable media environment, they were quickly able to form a coalition and Afghanistan was invaded in a matter of months. However in the years following the Taliban were able to re-organise and by 2006 the coalition was fighting a full-blown insurgency. In a display of media savvy the Taliban were able to force the coalition to reduce their use of air power by exaggerating or inventing reports of collateral damage and civilian casualties caused by airstrikes. Due to the negative media reports generated by this campaign, the ISAF was put under pressure to curtail its use of airpower[26].
Munzo tells us that the US has carried out many PSYOPS campaigns in Afghanistan, primarily hearts and minds activates and usually with underwhelming results. Problems usually resulted from a lack of cultural understanding on both sides as well as a chaotic and unwieldy leadership structure. Themes of operations included justifying the invasion to the Afghan people, framing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as enemies of the Afghans and promoting the benefits of democracy to all Afghans.[27]
In the lead up to the second Iraq war the United States and its allies, with the help of friendly media outlets, bombarded the world with the message that the removal of Saddam Hussein was imperative as he was stockpiling WMDs and was an imminent threat to the free world. Coalition forces invaded in March of 2003. Subsequently the case for invading was shown to have been built on stove piped intelligence cherry picked by policy makers to present a narrative for war[28]. Once the WMD narrative was debunked the United Stated quickly pivoted it justification toward bringing peace to the Middle East, Donald Rumsfeld Stated:
“For if Iraq… is able to move to the path of representative democracy, however bumpy the road, then the impact in the region and the world could be dramatic. Iraq could conceivably become a model – proof that a moderate Muslim state can succeed in the battle against extremism taking place in the Muslim world today”.[29]
These examples show that for the United Sates the primary motivations for the use of propaganda were to legitimise their intentions to go to war and to attempt to win the hearts and minds of the populations once the invasions had taken place.
In this paper, I have provided brief definitions of political conflict and propaganda. We explored some of the historical uses of propaganda as used in political conflict and then used the War on Terror as a case study to find motivations for the use of propaganda. The conclusion is that the primary motivations are to legitimise the actions of the user, usually in the eyes of their own populations. Other motivations are the winning of hearts and minds of occupied populations or the signalling of a state’s power to preserve order.
[1] Wolfsfeld, G. “Political Actors.” INFOCORE. 2015. https://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Def_Political_Actors.pdf (accessed 05 10, 2021).
[2] Mitchell, I M, and M Nicholson. ‘Rationality And The Analysis Of International Conflict.’, The Journal of the Operational Research Society, vol. 44, no. 11, 1993, p. 11-61.
[3] Jenog, Ho-Won, Peace And Conflict Studies: An Introduction. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000.
[4] Smith, Paul A, ‘The Nature of Political War’,’ In On Political War, Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1989, p. 2-28
[5] Baird, J W, “The Myth of Stalingrad.” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 4, no. 3 1969: 187-204.
[6]Ingram, H J, ‘A Brief History Of Propaganda During Conflict: A Lesson For Counter Terrorism Strategic Communications.’, ICCT Research Paper. The Hauge: Internetional Center For Counter-Terrorism, 2016.
[7] Merari, Ariel, ‘Terrorism As A Strategy Of Insurgency.’ In The History Of terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qeada, edited by A Blin, Berkeley: University of California, 2007, p. 12-53
[8] Jowett, Garth, and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion. 3rd. edn, London, Sage Publications, 1999.
[9] Porche, I R. III et al., Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries For An Army In A Wireless World. Sant Monica, RAND Corporation, 2013.
[10] Taylor, P. M., Debate: Strategic Communications Or Democratic Propaganda?. Journalism Studies, vol. 3 no. 3, 2002, p. 437-452.
[11] Sandhoff, Michelle. Service in a Time of Suspicion: Experiences of Muslims Serving in the U.S. Military Post-9/11. Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 2017.
[12] History.com, ‘A Timeline Of The U.S.-Led War On Terror.’ History.com https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/war-on-terror-timeline (accessed May 10, 2021)
[13] Smith, Paul A, ‘The Nature of Political War’
[14] Ingram, H J. “A Brief History Of Propaganda During Conflict
[15] Barrett, F, and T Sarbin, ‘The Rhetoric Of Terror: ‘War’ As A Misplaced Mataphor.’ In Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide To Theory A Practice, edited by J Arquilla, & D Borer, New York, Routledge, 2007, p. 16-33.
[16] Martin, G, Essentials Of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2008.
[17] Stoddel, Scott, ‘Terror TV’, The American Prospect, vol.12, no. 18, 2011, p. 35-38.
[18] Lakomy, Miron, ‘Danse macabre : Gore Images In The Islamic State’s “Dabiq” Magazine As A Propaganda Device’, The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, vol. 21, no. 2, 2019, p. 143-161.
[20] Lakomy, Miron. ‘Danse Macabre’.
[21] Lakomy, Miron. ‘Danse Macabre’.
[22] Jowett, Garth, and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion.
[23] Huang, Haifeng, “Propaganda as Signaling.” Comparative Politics, vol. 47, no. 4, 2015, p. 419-437.
[24] Lakomy, Miron. ‘Danse Macabre’
[25] Hatton, Arthur T, and Michael E Nielsen, “‘War on Terror’ In Our Backyard: Effects Of Framing and Violent ISIS Propaganda On anti-Muslim Prejudice.”, Behavioral Sciences Of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 8, no. 3, 2016, p. 163-176.
[26] Ingram, H J, ‘A Brief History Of Propaganda During Conflict’
[27] Munoz, Arturo, “Main Themes and Messages and Their Effectiveness.”, In U.S. Military Information Operations In Afghanistan: Effectiveness Of Psychological Operations 2001-2010, RAND Corporation, 2012, p. 31-94.
[28] Ingram, H J, ‘A Brief History Of Propaganda During Conflict’
[29] Rumsfeld, D. Remarks By The Secretary Of Defence Donald H Rumsfeld. Council On Foreign Relations, 27 May 2003, 2003.
References
Baird, J W, “The Myth of Stalingrad.” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 4, no. 3 1969: 187-204
Barrett, F, and T Sarbin, ‘The Rhetoric Of Terror: ‘War’ As A Misplaced Mataphor.’ In Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide To Theory A Practice, edited by J Arquilla, & D Borer, New York, Routledge, 2007, p. 16-33.
Dabiq, Issue 1, 2014.
Hatton, Arthur T, and Michael E Nielsen, “‘War on Terror’ In Our Backyard: Effects Of Framing and Violent ISIS Propaganda On anti-Muslim Prejudice.”, Behavioral Sciences Of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 8, no. 3, 2016, p. 163-176.
History.com, ‘A Timeline Of The U.S.-Led War On Terror.’ History.com https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/war-on-terror-timeline (accessed May 10, 2021)
Huang, Haifeng, “Propaganda as Signaling.” Comparative Politics, vol. 47, no. 4, 2015, p. 419-437.
[1]Ingram, H J, ‘A Brief History Of Propaganda During Conflict: A Lesson For Counter Terrorism Strategic Communications.’, ICCT Research Paper. The Hauge: Internetional Center For Counter-Terrorism, 2016.Jenog, Ho-Won, Peace And Conflict Studies: An Introduction. Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000.
Jowett, Garth, and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion. 3rd. edn, London, Sage Publications, 1999.
Lakomy, Miron, ‘Danse macabre : Gore Images In The Islamic State’s “Dabiq” Magazine As A Propaganda Device’, The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs, vol. 21, no. 2, 2019, p. 143-161.
Martin, G. Essentials Of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2008.
Merari, Ariel, ‘Terrorism As A Strategy Of Insurgency.’ In The History Of terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qeada, edited by A Blin, Berkeley: University of California, 2007, p. 12-53
Mitchell, I M, and M Nicholson. ‘Rationality And The Analysis Of International Conflict.’, The Journal of the Operational Research Society, vol. 44, no. 11, 1993, p. 11-61.
Munoz, Arturo, “Main Themes and Messages and Their Effectiveness.”, In U.S. Military Information Operations In Afghanistan: Effectiveness Of Psychological Operations 2001-2010, RAND Corporation, 2012, p. 31-94.
Porche, I R. III et al., Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries For An Army In A Wireless World. Sant Monica, RAND Corporation, 2013.
Rumsfeld, D. Remarks By The Secretary Of Defence Donald H Rumsfeld. Council On Foreign Relations, 27 May 2003, 2003.
Sandhoff, Michelle. Service in a Time of Suspicion: Experiences of Muslims Serving in the U.S. Military Post-9/11. Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 2017.
Smith, Paul A, ‘The Nature of Political War’,’ In On Political War, Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1989, p. 2-28
Stoddel, Scott, ‘Terror TV’, The American Prospect, vol.12, no. 18, 2011, p. 35-38.
Taylor, P. M., Debate: Strategic Communications Or Democratic Propaganda?. Journalism Studies, vol. 3 no. 3, 2002, p. 437-452.
Wolfsfeld, G. “Political Actors.” INFOCORE. 2015. https://www.infocore.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Def_Political_Actors.pdf (accessed 05 10, 2021).