Question: Just how religious is ‘religious terrorism’? Discuss with case studies from 2022 and 2023.
ISIS Recruits: Religious Warriors or Useful Fools?
The question about the degree to which religion influences acts of terrorist violence is often raised concerning the concept of “religious terrorism,” This essay will investigate the complex relationship between religion and terrorism through an analysis of ISIS recruitment methods, illuminating the various motivations and influences of these violent acts. Are ISIS recruits religious warriors or a modern version of the useful fools of the Cold War era?
We conclude that religion is often used as a motivator for front-line terrorists; however, their recruitment is based on manipulation and misinformation, while their leaders have more down-to-earth political goals. As a result, the front-line and suicide terrorists do seem comparable to the “useful idiots” who were recruited by the KGB during the Cold War and considered to be expendable once their utility ended; however, there is a significant difference in that while the useful fools were mostly unaware of the results of their actions ISIS recruits, though manipulated do eventually make a concise decision to carry out acts of terrorism.
To carry out this analysis, we must first define religious terrorism and differentiate it from other forms of terrorist violence. We will then briefly examine the phenomena of the “useful fool” as ascribed to the KGB during the Cold War. Next, we examine the recruitment methods used by ISIS, focusing on how it recruits English-speaking Muslims and fighters from the West.
ISIS was chosen for this analysis as it has been shown to still have an active recruitment and propaganda arm that provides a case study from 2022 and 2023. We will determine the role of religion as a motivating factor in terrorism and the influence of political aims on religiously motivated terrorism.
In Western scholarship, the idea of “religious violence” and its implication that religion and violence are inextricably linked has a long history (Cavanaugh, 2004). However, David Rapoport’s influential article analysing the use of terror in the three monotheistic religions is where a more precise term, “religious terrorism,” originated (Gunning & Jackson, 2011). From this foundation, scholars such as Juergensmeyer, Sageman, and Hoffman have elaborated on the concept of ”religious terrorism,” assigning traits and substantive assertions that delineate it as a particular “type” of political violence that is fundamentally distinct from earlier or other forms of terrorism. Religious terrorism “represents a very different and possibly far more lethal threat than that posed by more familiar, traditional terrorist adversaries,” according to (Hoffman, 2017) it results from radically different value systems, validation mechanisms, moral concepts, and worldviews. He says that the most important distinguishing feature of contemporary terrorism is the religious imperative. One significant repercussion of this apparent turning point in terrorism is that it renders analysis of terrorism based on established groups obsolete (Gunning & Jackson, 2011)
“Traditional” terrorism is characterized by easily recognizable organizations like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Irish Republican Army (IRA). These organizations support one class or ethnic group over another or have specific grievances. These groups attack specific targets with conventional weapons and explosives to humiliate or harm the state or group they are waging war against. They (typically) specifically avoid needless bloodshed, at times alerting authorities to bombings in public places (Tendler, 1996). This is done in order to maintain a position in succeeding governments and be considered an eligible participant in negotiations in the future (Simon & Benjamin, 2001).
Martin describes the New Terrorism as based on cell-based networks that can act independently. They are prepared to use high-intensity weapons and asymmetrical tactics that maximize causalities and have hazy, frequently apocalyptic religious motivations (Martin, 2008). The use of cells creates an amorphous grouping of organizations under an umbrella franchise, such as Islamic State or al Qaeda. This reduces reliance on state sponsorship, allowing the groups to be much less restrained in their attacks than traditional terrorist organizations (Morgan, 2004). The final distinction between traditional and modern terrorists, according to (Martin, 2008), is how well they manipulate the media and use the Internet.
By providing a moral justification, per the terrorist worldview, for actions that would otherwise revolt most people, modern terrorist groups have increased their threat by using religious identity. This is a result of the demographic that the terrorists are targeting. Religious terrorists see themselves as outsiders seeking to replace the entire world order. In contrast, traditional terrorists aim to bring about a change in a system that is seen as generally good but in need of correction. Due to the religious terrorist’s need to purge everyone except fellow believers, more lethal weapons can be used in attacks because winning over supporters is not the primary objective (Hoffman, 2017). This focus on religion as a foundation of new terrorism has led some countries, Australia included, to include a ‘religious cause’ component to their anti-terror legislation whereby in order to bring charges for a terrorist act, the act must have a religious, ideological, or political cause (Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s100.1) (Jabri Markwell, 2023).
Useful fool” or sometimes “useful idiot” is a term used to describe someone cynically being used by the leaders of a cause. The term, which is falsely attributed to Vladimir Lenin, was frequently used during the Cold War to refer to non-communists, sympathetic to communism, who were regarded by Russian intelligence as naive and, therefore, could be manipulated to unknowingly support the strategies of the KGB (Treguer, 2021). These individuals were often recruited because they were naive, gullible, or had strong ideological beliefs aligned with the Soviet Union’s interests.
The KGB used a variety of methods to recruit and manipulate useful fools. One common method was to target individuals who were already involved in left-wing political organizations or movements. These individuals were often attracted to the Soviet Union’s promises of social justice and equality. The KGB would also target individuals who had access to sensitive information, such as journalists, government officials, and academics (Treguer, 2021). Their “usefulness” lay in spreading or legitimizing communist ideologies, often in democratic or capitalist settings, without being directly connected to or controlled by communist parties. Thus, the supposed “Russian attitude” towards these “useful idiots” was one of utilitarian value: they were useful and disposable tools to further the Soviet cause abroad (Naylor, 2021).
The self-declared Pan-Islamic Caliphate Islamic State or ISIS is a Sunni extremist organization with roots in northern Iraq and Syria. At its height in 2014, the Islamic State ruled over sizable portions of both nations, absorbing the bureaucracy and resources of the governments as well as business and industry. The last Islamic State territory in Iraq and Syria was lost in March 2019 (Australian Government, 2023). As a result, the Islamic State has since reverted to conventional terrorist tactics in the region, including areas within Turkey, with increasing ferocity and tactical sophistication.
As of 2022 – 2023, through satellite entities that are operationally active within designated “provinces” (Wilayat), Islamic State continues to maintain a strong presence worldwide. These include the Abu Sayyaf Group, IS-East Asia, IS-Sinai, IS-Libya, IS Somalia IS-Khorasan Province, and IS West Africa Province, all of which are designated terrorist organizations under the Criminal Code of Australia (Australian Government, 2023). Despite the fact that the number of foreign fighters joining ISIS in Iraq and Syria has significantly decreased as a result of the group’s territorial losses and the growing difficulty of traveling to the region, ISIS has continued to recruit and in recent years has urged potential recruits to travel directly to other ISIS strongholds or remain in their home countries to carry out attacks as part of its global campaign. (Australian Government, 2023).
In these recruitment efforts, the Islamic State presents itself as the embodiment of true Islam as practiced by the first generations of Muslims (Salafism), and it primarily draws on Wahhabism, a particularly strict form of Salafism. The organization is skilled at fostering and utilizing already-existing sectarian rifts in the Middle East. The Islamic State uses religious and racial prejudice to recruit followers and justify its actions or to win over support and defeat those who actively oppose it (Hassan, 2019).
It should be noted, however, that Islamic religious authorities have rejected ISIS’s attempts to connect Islam to its actions. In 2014 and 2015, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al Sheikh, declared that ISIS and Al Qaeda are “Islam’s number one enemy” highlighting that extremism, militancy, and terrorism have nothing to do with Islam. The actions of ISIS against Christians in Mosul were deemed un-Islamic in 2014 by the Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq, deeming them contrary to the Prophet Mohammed’s teachings regarding the relationship with the “People of the Book” (Christians, Jews). Over 120 academics and Islamic scholars also found that ISIS had committed over 20 Islam-related offenses (Wilson Center, 2015).
At its height in 2014, ISIS seized control of roughly 40% of Iraq and 60% of Syria. Additionally, it drew more than 40,000 foreign fighters from more than 130 nations into its ranks. ISIS terrorized people in the areas it seized and carried out terrorist attacks worldwide, including Sydney, Jakarta, Brussels, New York, Istanbul, London, Nice and Paris. More than 14 affiliates in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia also joined ISIS’s global network (Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020). The recruitment of Westerners and English-speaking Muslims by ISIS has been a significant concern for counterterrorism efforts. The strategies and factors used in this recruitment are outlined below.
Online Propaganda and Social Media: ISIS has successfully spread its message and attracted new members using social media and online propaganda platforms (Johnston, 2022; Awan, 2017; Badawy & Ferrara, 2018). These platforms enable ISIS to connect with a global audience, target particular demographics, and customize their messages using various languages, including English, Arabic, Russian, and others (Ibrahim & Shi, 2019). Welch found that ISIS propaganda materials’ use of videos, images, and narratives was particularly effective at luring recruits (Welch, 2018). Online platforms’ capacity to foster a sense of community and belonging has also been a key component of recruitment efforts (Badawy & Ferrara, 2018).
Narratives and Ideology: ISIS propaganda often employs powerful narratives that appeal to individuals’ psychological predispositions and desires for heroism, justice, and belonging (Yoder et al., 2020; Welch, 2018). The narratives highlight the establishment of a caliphate, the defence of Islam, and the promise of a utopian society (Rane & Courty, 2020). By framing their actions as part of a larger ideological struggle, ISIS targets individuals who may feel marginalized, disenchanted, or alienated from their societies. The manipulation of religious symbols and the conflation of Islam and Islamist ideology in propaganda materials further contribute to the appeal of ISIS among Western Muslims (Rane & Courty, 2020). ISIS employs sophisticated strategies to manipulate information and shape public opinion. This includes the dissemination of false narratives, framing techniques, and the use of violent and shocking imagery to instil fear and attract attention (Mahood & Rane, 2016; Ibrahim & Shi, 2019). By exploiting grievances and perceived injustices, ISIS seeks to present itself as a viable alternative and a force for change (Shorer, 2018).
Targeting Vulnerable Individuals: ISIS has shown a particular interest in targeting vulnerable individuals, including young adults and women (Cottee & Cunliffe, 2018; Shorer, 2018). Video games, social networks, and chat rooms allow ISIS to establish relationships and engage in stage-by-stage relational development with potential recruits, sometimes called grooming. The promise of adventure, purpose, and a sense of belonging can appeal to individuals who may feel marginalized or disconnected from their communities (Abumelhim et al., 2022). The recruitment of women by ISIS has also been facilitated through the manipulation of gender roles and the promise of empowerment (Shorer, 2018). Perhaps most egregious, their recruitment strategies online have included deliberately targeting people with specific mental health disorders (such as autism spectrum disorder) with the aim of stimulating them to commit lone-wolf terrorist attacks (Lennings et al., 2010).
As noted above, the results of these methods were a specular success in the early days of the Caliphate, and even though ISIS is significantly weakened, they are still being used today. ISIS differs from other militant Islamist groups in that it was born during the internet era, when people, especially young adults, feel like the world is smaller and more connected than ever.
ISIS uses a variety of methods to lure recruits, including face-to-face recruiting on the ground, cold calling online, and using friends and family networks. The latter involves recruiters using swarming and love-bombing tactics to get in touch with people who support ISIS propaganda by liking, retweeting, sharing, or otherwise responding to ISIS social media recruitment. The recruiters lavishly court them and going out of their way to make them feel special in an effort to persuade them to join the group. Others draw recruits by involving them in political and religious discussions meant to start them down the ISIS pathway (Lennings et al., 2010). Some recruits made friends over the Internet with those who had joined and travelled to the battlefield and were encouraged by these new friends to do the same. The common thread through these recruitment methods was the misrepresentation of Islam and the realities of life in the Caliphate in order to convince their new ”friends” to travel and join ISIS.
When speaking with ISIS members on the Internet or viewing ISIS propaganda, most men and women recruited anticipated a much more positive experience than they had. ISIS portrayed hijrah, the allegedly required Islamic migration to the Caliphate to live under sharia law, as a way to find personal significance, purpose, and belonging while upholding Islamic principles, living in prosperity, and enjoying protection. They neglected to mention the brutal penalties for disobedience, the fact that ISIS could accuse and punish anyone for any reason at any time, the fact that men would be forced to fight for the organization whether they wanted to or not, the fact that women would need to remarry in succession if their husbands were killed, and the fact that once a person joined, they could not leave. Thus, the recruiters presented an idealistic Islamic state, and those who travelled explicitly to join ISIS had gone with the expectation of realizing some utopian dream that, in the end, was radically dissimilar from the idealized state they had been sold (Speckhard & Ellenberg, 2020).
Can the argument be made that front-line terrorists or those that “self-radicalise” are comparable to useful fools? Although there are distinct differences between ISIS recruits and the idea of “useful fools,” similarities between the two can be found. Both ‘useful fools’ and ISIS recruits are susceptible to manipulation techniques that skew their worldview and affect their decisions. ISIS recruiters strategically motivate potential members, presenting an image of purpose, belonging, and adherence to Islamic principles, whereas ‘useful fools’ are manipulated by ideologies without necessarily being aware of their role or impact. They propagate perspectives or ideologies inadvertently, being valuable for their influence rather than direct action. However, the core difference lies in the level of involvement and ideological commitment. ISIS recruits consciously choose a path of terrorism based on their manipulated ideological convictions, often expecting a particular outcome, whereas ‘useful fools’ play their part unknowingly, spreading ideologies without complete awareness of the agendas they serve. Therefore, while both are victims of manipulation, the level of consent, awareness, and active participation differentiate ISIS recruits from ‘useful fools.’
In this paper, we have defined religious terrorism and differentiated it from other forms of terrorist violence. We then briefly examined the role of the “useful fool” during the cold war before moving on to analyse the recruitment methods used by ISIS following their loss of territory. The still active recruitment efforts provide a case study from 2022 – 2023.
By comparing and contrasting the motivations of ISIS recruits with the “useful fools” of the Cold War, we conclude that while religion plays a crucial role, functioning as a powerful motivator and recruiting tool for many terrorist cells, it is primarily used as a shield or justification for more terrestrial, political objectives. Recruit experiences reinforce this assertion, revealing that behind many religiously framed calls to action or violence, there lie strategic misinformation and earthly political aims of the leaders. In contrast, recruits are often less interested in the religious aspect than in fulfilling more basic needs. Lastly, modern media manipulation techniques have increasingly blurred the lines between religious conviction and political ambitions. Consequently, our understanding of ‘religious terrorism’ needs to evolve, acknowledging that religion is not the sole instigator but a component of a larger construct involving political, sociological, and psychological elements.
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